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Christ T. Troupis, ISB # 4549 
TROUPIS LAW OFFICE , 
801 E. State Street, Ste 50 
POBox2408 
Eagle, Idaho 83616 
Telephone: 208/ 938-5584 
Facsimile: 208/ 938-5482 
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CHRISTOPHER o. RICH, Clerk 
By SANTIAGO BARRIOS 
Dl!PUTY . 
Attorney for Plaintiff Employers Resource, an Idaho Corporation 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR ADA COUNTY 
EMPLOYERS RESOURCE 
MANAGEMENT COMPANY, 
An Idaho Corporation, 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
CV 0-C 1605 467 ~ 
Plaintiff, Case No.: 
vs. 
MEGAN RONK, in her capacity as 
Director of the IDAHO 
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, 
COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY 
RELIEF 
Defendant. 
COME NOW THE PLAINTIFF EMPLOYERS RESOURCE OF AMERICA, INC., 
an Idaho Corporation, by and through_ its attorney, Christ T. Troupis, and for its cause of action 
against Defendant, alleges as follows: 
1. This action arises under the provisions of Article II, § 1, Article III, § 1, and Article 
VII, §5 of the Idaho Constitution. Article II, §1 provides: 
The powers of the government of this state are divided into three distinct departments, the 
legislative, executive and judicial; and no person or collection of persons charged 
with· the exercise of powers properly belonging to one of these departments shall exercise 
any powers properly belonging to either of the others, except as in this 
constitution expressly directed or permitted. 
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2. Article 3, § 1 of the Idaho Constitution provides that: "The legislative power of the state 
shall be vested in a senate and house of representatives." 
3. Article VII, §5 of the Idaho Constitution, provides that "all taxes shall be uniform upon 
the same class of subjects ... [and] the legislature.may allow such exemptions from taxation from 
time to time as shall seem necessary and just..." 
4. The Idaho Supreme Court has held that the functions of the legislature are to be 
exercised by it alone. The legislature has plenary authority in all matters of taxation except those 
prohibited or limited by the constitution. Union Pacific R. Co. v. Board ofTax Appeals, 103 
Idaho 808,654 P.2d 901 (1982) 
5. In 2014, the Idaho legislature passed the Idaho Reimbursement Incentive Act, 
("IRIA") which was then amended in 2015. The IRIA authorizes tax credits to be issued by the 
· Director of the Department of Commerce to a qualified business entity. To qualify for the tax 
credit, a business entity files an application with the Department of Commerce. The application 
is reviewed by the Director solely to determine if all the information required by the statute is 
present. The completed application is then reviewed by an Economic Advisory Council ("EAC") 
within the Dept. of Commerce, whose members are appointed by the Governor. The EAC is 
established under Idaho Code §67-4704. 
6. This lawsuit is brought on the grounds that the Idaho Department of Commerce, 
by and through the actions of its Director and members of the Economic Advisory Council, has 
violated and is continuing to violate Article II, §1, Article Ill, §1 and Article VII, §5 of the Idaho 
Constitution of the Idaho Constitution by exercising non-delegable legislative power vested 
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solely in the Idaho Senate and House of Representatives, with respect to the determination of 
Idaho's tax policy and the issuance of tax exemptions and/or credits to some Idaho taxpayers. 
7. Plaintiff seeks relief in the form of a declaratory judgment that the actions of the 
Department of Commerce through its Director and Economic Advisory Council complained of 
herein, exceed the constitutional authority of the Executive Branch ofldaho State Government, 
- -
and that Department, and that all such actions therefore should be declared null and void. 
8.' Plaintiff Employers Resource Management Company, an Idaho Corporation, 
("Employers Resource") is one of Idaho's top privately-held companies. Recently, the EAC 
granted Paylocity, an Illinois company, and one of Employers' Resource competitors, a 28% 
credit against its future tax liabilities in return for its promise to create 'new jobs' in Boise. The 
estimated tax credit granted to Paylocity by the EAC is approximately $6,500,000. 
9. The State ofldaho's grant of a massive tax break to Paylocity has given it an 
unfair economic advantage over Employers' Resource, including the ability to lure Plaintiffs' 
employees away from Employers' Resource. 
10. Defendant Megan Ronk is the Director of the Idaho Department of Commerce 
and is named in that official capacity. 
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION 
(For Declaratory Relief) 
11. Plaintiff re-alleges and· incorporates by reference the allegations of Paragraphs 1-
10, as though set forth herein in full. 
12. The Idaho Constitution vests all taxing power in the Legislature. This plenary 
authority of the Legislature is not delegable, and forbids a delegation of unrestricted and 
unguided taxing power. 
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13. The Idaho Department of Commerce is an agency within the Executive Branch of 
Idaho State Government. Pursuant to Article II, § 1 of the Idaho Constitution, all agencies within 
the Executive Branch are prohibited from exercising any of the powers reserved to the 
Legislative or the Judicial Branch of Idaho State Government. 
14. In or about 2014, the Idaho Legislature enacted Idaho Code §67-4739 which sets 
out statutory requirements for a business to qualify for a refundable tax credit from the State of 
Idaho. That statute provides: 
"(1) A business entity may claim a refundable tax credit for creating a minimum number 
of new jobs in the state ofldaho. In order to be considered for participation, an 
applicant or its designated representative must submit an application to the director 
and shall include: 
(a) A complete description of the proposed project and the economic benefit that 
will accrue to the state as a result of the project; 
(b) A description or explanation of whether the project will occur or how it will be 
altered if the tax credit application is denied by the council; 
( c) Proof of a community match; 
( d) A letter from the tax commission confirming that the applicant is in good 
standing in the state of Idaho and is not in unresolved arrears in the payment of 
any state tax or fee administered by the tax commission; 
( e) A detailed statement with an estimate ofldaho goods and services to be 
consumed or purchased by the applicant during the term; 
(f) Known or expected detriments to the state or existing industries in the state; 
(g) An anticipated project inception date and proposed schedule of progress; 
(h) Proposed performance requirements and measurements that must be met prior to 
issuance of the tax credit; 
(i) A detailed description of the proposed capital investment; 
G) A detailed description of jobs to be created, an approximation of the number of 
suchjobs to be created and the projected average wage to be paid for such jobs; 
(k) A detailed description of the estimated new state tax revenues to be generated by 
the project; 
(1) Identification of any individual or entity included within the application that is 
entitled to a rebate pursuant to section 63-3641 or 63-4408, Idaho Code, or is 
required to obtain a separate seller's permit pursuant to chapter 36, title 63, 
Idaho Code; and · 
(m)The federal employer identification or social security number for each individual 
or entity stated as the business entity in the agreement. 
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000009
(2) Upon satisfaction by the director that all requirements are met pursuant to this 
chapter, the director shall submit such application to the council [Economic Advisory 
Council]. The council shall review the application, may request additional 
information and shall approve or reject the application. An approval or rejection from 
the council shall not be considered a contested case pursuant to chapter 52, title 67, 
Idaho Code; provided, however, that nothing in this section shall prohibit an 
aggrieved applicant from seeking judicial review as provided in chapter 52, title 67, 
Idaho Code. 
(3) If the council approves the application, the council shall instruct the director to enter 
. into an agreement with the applicant with the terms of the council's approval. If the 
. council rejects an application, the applicant may reapply with a new application." 
15. The only requirement that the legislature included in Idaho Code §67-4739 for a 
business to obtain EAC approval of a tax credit application, apart from providing information to 
the Director of the Department of Commerce, is the creation of "new jobs." In order to claim the 
. ' 
tax credit, an entity must create a minimum number of new jobs in the state of Idaho. "Minimum 
new jobs" is defined in Idaho Code §67-4738(11) as "not less than twenty (20) such jobs over 
the term of the project if created within a rural community, or not less than fifty (50) such jobs 
over the term of the project if created within an urban community." 
16. Idaho Code §67-4739(1)(a) - (m) specifies information required to be provided as 
part of the tax credit application process. However, in enacting this statute, the Idaho Legislature 
did not establish standards, guidelines, or requirements as to how or whether this information is 
to be used in the process of approving an application for issuance of a tax credit. Further, the 
statute does not mandate that the EAC issue any required factual findings in support of the 
approval or disapproval of an applicant's request for a tax credit. Without such objective or even 
subjective standards in place, all decisions of the EAC are for all practical purposes, exempt 
from substantive review by the Judicial Branch of Idaho State Government. 
17. Under the provisions ofldaho Code §67-4739, the EAC exercises complete 
discretion in determining whether to grant or deny an application. The determination that an 
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entity will create the required number of 'new jobs' is at once arbitrary and capricious, in that the 
Council alone evaluates information submitted with no required objective criteria or findings, 
and has unlimited discretion to grant or deny any application regardless of the information 
submitted. 
18. The Director of the Department of Commerce has yielded all authority to the 
EAC with regard to the grant or denial of tax credits. The Director's sole duty is to determine 
whether the application is complete. If so, the Director is required to submit the application to the 
EAC, whose decision is conclusive, and whose discretion is unlimited. 
19. Although provision has been made for judicial review of a rejected application by 
the aggrieved applicant, the law provides that a denial is not considered a "contested case," and . 
the law with regard to appeal of an administrative agency decision requires the Court to defer to 
the agency's exercise of discretionary authority. So, as a practical matter, there is no judicial 
remedy to an aggrieved applicant. 
20. The only purported limit on the EAC's discretionary authority to grant a tax credit 
to a business is the requirement that a business entity create 'new jobs.' However, even with 
respect to that one requirement, the Idaho Legislature did not enact any "standards, guidelines, 
restrictions or qualifications" in the IRIA. As a result, the EAC has virtually unlimited 
discretionary authority to determine whether an entity qualifies for favorable tax treatment, and 
the same unlimited discretionary authority to deny such tax relief to other selected business 
entities. Without such objective standards, the exercise of EA C's grant of authority is subject to 
political favoritism, corruption and cronyism. 
2 J. Plaintiff is informed and believes that the Idaho Department of Commerce, by and 
through the EAC, has and will continue to grant tax relief to selected businesses arbitrarily and 
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capriciously, and by reason of these facts has and is exercising powers reserved under the Idaho 
Constitution to the Legislature and the Judiciary, and in the exercise of those powers, is violating 
Article II, §1, Article III, §1 and Article VII, §5 of the Idaho Constitution. 
22. Idaho taxpayers have and will suffer irreparable harm if the Idaho Department of 
Commerce, by and through the EAC, continues to grant tax relief to some business entities and 
deny that relief to other entities, on an arbi!fary and discretionary basis, in violation of the Idaho 
Constitution's grant of all taxing authority to the state Legislature. 
23. Plaintiff is entitled to have the Court enter its Decree Declaring that the Idaho 
Department of Commerce and the Economic Advisory Council within that Department do not 
have authority under the Idaho Constitution t,o administer the provisions ofldaho Code §67-
4739, and do not have constitutional authority to issue tax credits to business entities selected by 
the Department under the provisions of this Act, and that all actions taken by the Idaho 
Department of Commerce and the EAC under this statute are null and void. 
24. Plaintiff has been required to retain counsel to prosecute this action to vindicate 
the Constitutional rights of Plaintiff and other Idaho taxpayers, and therefore is entitled to 
recover its reasonable attorneys' fees and costs incurred herein. 
II 
II 
II 
II 
II 
II 
II 
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WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for judgment against Defendants as follows: 
I. For a judicial decree declaring that the action of the Idaho Department of Commerce, 
by and through the Economic Advisory Council, in administering the IRIA, and 
granting tax credits, are in excess of its constitutional authority and therefore null and 
void. 
2. For attorneys' fees and costs of suit incurred herein; and 
3. For such other and further relief as the Court deems just and equitable. 
Dated: March 23, 2016 
By ll/42~ 
Christ T.Trupis 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
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LA WREN CE G. WASDEN 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 
STEVEN L. OLSEN, ISB #3586 
Chief of Civil Litigation 
CARL J. WITHR0E, ISB #7051 
Deputy Attorney General 
954 W. Jefferson Street, 2nd Floor 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, ID 83720-0010 
Telephone: (208) 334-2400 
Facsimile: (208) 854-8073 
Attorney for Defendant 
MAY O 4 2016 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Cieri< 
By ALESIA BUTTS 
DEPUTY 
ORIGINAL 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
EMPLOYERS RESOURCE MANAGEMENT 
COMPANY, an Idaho Corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
VS. 
MEGAN RONK, in her capacity as Director of 
the IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, 
Defendant. 
) 
) Case No. CV OC 1605467 
) 
) DEFENDANT'S MOTION 
) TO DISMISS 
) 
) Oral Argument Requested 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
-----------------) 
Defendant, Idaho Department of Commerce Director Megan Ronk, moves the Court for 
judgment of dismissal of Plaintiffs complaint, in its entirety, with prejudice, pursuant to Idaho 
R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). This motion is supported by the accompanying memorandum in support, 
filed contemporaneously herewith. 
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DATED this 4th day of May, 2016. 
STATE OF IDAHO 
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 
1throe 
Deputy Attorney General 
****************************************************** 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 4th day of May, 2016, I caused to be served a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing by the following method to: 
Christ T. Troupis ~~ail 
TROUPIS LAW OFFICE O Hand Delivery 
801 E. State Street, Suite 50 D Certified Mail, Return Receipt Requested 
P.O. Box 2408 D Overnight Mail 
Eagle, ID 83616 D Facsimile: (208) 938-5482 
D Electronic Mail: ctroupis@troupislaw.com 
- ar J. Wit , e 
Deputy Attorney General 
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LAWRENCE G. WASDEN 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 
STEVEN L. OLSEN, ISB #3586 
Chief of Civil Litigation 
CARL J. WITHR0E, ISB #7051 
Deputy Attorney General 
954 W. Jefferson Street, 2nd Floor 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, ID 83720-0010 
Telephone: (208) 334-2400 
Facsimile: (208) 854-8073 
Attorney for Defendant 
NO, Fm Af tl 
A.M. ____ P.M.-~ui,---
MAY O 4 2016 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk 
By ALESIA BUTTS 
DEPUTY 
ORIGINAL 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
EMPLOYERS RESOURCE MANAGEMENT 
COMPANY, an Idaho Corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MEGAN RONK, in her capacity as Director of 
the IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, 
Defendant. 
) 
) Case No. CV OC 1605467 
) 
) MEMORANDUMINSUPPORT 
) OF DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO 
) DISMISS 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
-----------------) 
Defendant moves to dismiss Plaintiffs case in its entirety, with prejudice, under Idaho R. 
Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Plaintiffs complaint fails to state a claim for which relief can be granted. We 
explain below that Plaintiff lacks standing. 
INTRODUCTION 
Like many other states, Idaho established a system to incentivize the creation of private-
sector jobs in Idaho. See Idaho Code § 67-4737. This system, the Idaho Reimbursement 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS - 1 
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Incentive Act, makes refundable tax credits available to businesses in any industry with a 
competitive project that adds a minimum number of new, full-time, nonseasonal jobs ( depending 
on whether the location is rural or urban) paying an average wage that equals or exceeds the 
wage for the county where the business is located. See Idaho Code § 67-4738(11), (12). The 
credit is available to both existing Idaho businesses and new Idaho businesses. A successful 
applicant may receive a refundable tax credit for up to 15 years and up to 30% of the new 
revenue Idaho receives from the company's corporate income tax, payroll taxes, and sales and 
use tax attributable to a new project. The Idaho Department of Commerce administers the 
program. Idaho Code§ 67-4740. 
A business seeking the credit must apply. Idaho Code § 67-4739. Among the many 
requirements an applicant must satisfy is that a business must demonstrate community support. 
Id. at (l)(c). This means that the applicable local government unit must demonstrate "active 
support of the applicant" including a contribution of money, fee waivers, in-kind services, 
providing infrastructure, or a combination of these things. Idaho Code § 67-4738(5). A letter of 
commitment by the local governing board must accompany the community match. Id. 
As part of her review process, the Commerce director and her office conduct an in-depth 
economic analysis of the project and its application material. This includes analysis of both the 
benefits and potential detriments to the state or existing industries in the state. See Idaho Code § 
67-4741(c) After the Commerce director reviews the application and if she determines that the 
applicant has established eligibility for the credit, the director submits the application and her 
recommended term and percentage of refund to the Economic Advisory Council for its review. 
Idaho Code § 67-4739(2). The Council may approve or reject the project; and, it may ask for 
additional information to aid its review. Id. If the Council approves the application and the 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS - 2 
000017
• <., 
I , 
director's recommended terms, the applicant business and the Commerce Department enter into 
an agreement specifying the terms of the credit, including the duration of the credit, the 
forecasted amount of new tax revenue the project will generate, and the percentage of tax 
revenues that will be reimbursed to the project. Idaho Code§ 67-4740. 
The tax credit under the Reimbursement Incentive Act is a performance-based credit. 
Each year, every business that has entered into an agreement with the Commerce Department for 
a tax credit must provide a detailed report demonstrating compliance with its agreement and the 
other requirements. Idaho Code§ 67-4741. If on review, the Commerce Department determines 
the applicant's information is inadequate to justify the tax credit, Commerce may seek further 
information, or deny the credit. Id at (2). If the Commerce Department determines the 
information provided by the applicant justifies a tax credit, the Commerce Department issues the 
tax credit authorization and provides a copy of the authorization to the Idaho State Tax 
Commission. Id at (3). The applicant then claims the credit on its tax return. The Commerce 
Department must file a report annually with the Governor and Legislature detailing the 
Commerce Department's success, with specific economic metrics. Idaho Code§ 67-4742. 
THE STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Defendant's motion is of the 12(b)(6) variety. So, the Court's task is to look solely to the 
pleadings to determine whether a claim for relief has been stated. Young v. City of Ketchum, 137 
Idaho 102, 104, 44 P.3d 1157, 1159 (2002). When the motion is, Defendant's is, a motion to 
dismiss for lack of standing, the Court will examine whether Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged the 
requisite elements of standing in their complaint to survive Defendant's motion. Id. 
II I 
II I 
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ARGUMENT 
Plaintiff is a company in Idaho. It has not applied for any tax credit under the 
Reimbursement Incentive Act. Yet, it challenges the validity of the Reimbursement Incentive 
Act, not because the Act has caused it any harm, but that "Idaho taxpayers will suffer irreparable 
harm if the Idaho Department of Commerce, by and through the [Economic Advisory Council] 
continues to grant tax relief to some business entities and deny that relief to other entities .... " 
Complaint, p. 7. Indeed, the closest Plaintiff comes to alleging concrete harm specific to it is its 
allegation that a competitor received a credit. Complaint, p. 3. These allegations are insufficient 
to establish that Plaintiff has standing to sue. This Court should therefore dismiss the Complaint 
in its entirety, with prejudice. 
Standing is a fairly basic principle of jurisdiction. To show standing, and thus to survive 
a motion to dismiss, Plaintiffs must "allege or demonstrate an injury in fact and a substantial 
likelihood that the judicial relief requested will prevent or redress the claimed injury." Miles v. 
Idaho Power Co., 116 Idaho 635, 641, 778 P.2d 757, 763 (1989). The plaintiffs injury must be 
"peculiar or personal that is different than that suffered by any other member of the public." 
Selkirk-Priest Basin Ass'n v. State, 128 Idaho 831, 834, 919 P.2d 1032, 1035 (1996). There is 
more to the injury requirement than "the defendant harmed me"; standing necessitates a 
"showing of 'distinct palpable injury' and 'fairly traceable causal connection between the 
claimed injury and the challenged conduct." Young v. City of Ketchum, 137 Idaho at 104, 44 
P.3d at 1159. And the alleged injury must be real-that is, "standing can never be based on a 
merely hypothetical injury." State v. Philip Morris, Inc., 158 Idaho 874, 882, 354 P.3d 187, 195 
(2015). The standing inquiry, then, focuses on the party seeking relief, not on the issues the 
party wants decided. Miles, 116 Idaho at 639, 778 P.3d at 761. 
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Plaintiffs complaint comes nowhere close to satisfying these requirements. It alleges 
injury on behalf of taxpayers, not the company itself. Complaint, p. 8. Plaintiff does nothing to 
distinguish harm it says will fall on taxpayers from harm that will fall specifically to it. General 
taxpayer standing-meaning a complaint that all taxpayers will suffer injury from government 
conduct-does riot exist because in that instance the conduct affects all taxpayers the same. See 
Van Valkenburgh v. Citizens for Term Limits, 135 Idaho 121, 124, 15 P.3d 1129, 1132 (2000); 
Selkirk-Priest Basin Assn, 128 Idaho at 834, 919 P.2d at 1035 (no standing where plaintiff failed 
to show peculiar or personal injury that is different from that suffered by any other member of 
,. 
the public); Idaho Sch. for Equal Educ. Opportunity v. Evans, 123 Idaho 573, 850 P.2d 724 
(1993) (no taxpayer standing to challenge insufficient school funding because they did not suffer 
distinct, palpable injury different than anyone else); Greer v. Lewiston Golf & Country Club, 
Inc., 81 Idaho 393, 342 P.2d 719 (1959) (no standing to challenge disannexing ordinance even 
though they could suffer increased property taxes; increased taxes would be common to all 
taxpayers of the city). This is so even if the taxpayer alleges some indirect harm. Koch v. 
Canyon County, 145 Idaho 158, 177 P.3d 372 (2008). By definition, an allegation that Idaho 
taxpayers will suffer is an allegation that plaintiffs injury is just the same as its fellow 
taxpayers'-and hence, not distinct and peculiar to them. They cannot maintain their suit on this 
basis of harm. 
Neither can Plaintiff maintain its suit over a standing defense on the basis that an alleged 
competitor received a credit. Assuming their argument is that their competitor will be aided by 
the credit, they have failed to allege any harm from that alleged aid to a competitor; but more 
importantly, the Supreme Court has firmly rejected a claim that added competition in the 
marketplace is the sort of harm that can confirm standing. In Martin v. Camas County, 150 
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Idaho 508, 248 P.3d l243 (2011), a plaintiff sought to challenge a county zoning decision that, 
the plaintiff said, increased the availability of lots zoned like his. The theory was that with a 
higher supply of like lots, the value of the plaintiffs lots would drop. The plaintiffs claim that 
the increased number of lots would harm in the form of increased competition was dismissed: 
His purported injuries were "thoroughly speculative and cannot be said to be specific or distinct 
and palpable"; the Court said that it has "never held that increased competition alone is sufficient 
to confer standing." 150 Idaho at 514,248 P.3d at 1249. 
In the one reported Idaho case where a taxpayer had standing as a taxpayer, the Idaho 
Supreme Court's holding was narrow, and plaintiffs case is nothing like it. In Ameritel Inns, 
Inc. v. Greater Boise Auditorium District, 141 Idaho 849, 119 P.3d 624 (2005), the Court 
allowed a taxpayer in an auditorium district to challenge the district's expenditure of public 
money to advocate for voter approval of proposed bonds. Id. at 851, 119 P .3d at 626. That 
public advocacy for a particular position, the hotel argued, violated state law. But Ameritel Inns 
is nothing like this case because the auditorium had extracted a tax from the hotel and then was 
allegedly using that money to advocate in favor of the bond-something that was illegal. And, if 
the auditorium's advocacy efforts were successful and the bond passed, the hotel would have 
endured an imminent and certain increase in taxes since the obligation for the bond fell on the 
owners within the auditorium district. But here, the challenge is not to the extraction from 
Plaintiff and subsequent use of that money in violation of state law; rather, the system Plaintiff 
challenges is a tax credit to someone else. There is a difference between the two. See Ariz. 
Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn, 563 U.S. 125, 142 (2011) (no taxpayer standing to challenge 
tax credit system that matched contributions to organizations that provided scholarships to 
private schools). Tax credits are not the same thing as expenditures because simply reducing 
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one's tax liability is not a sum paid out by the government. See Manzara v. State, 343 S.W.3d 
656, 660 (Mo. 2011). And so there is no taxpayer standing in this case to challenge a tax credit. 
See DiamlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332 (2006). 
Plaintiffs case is unlike Ameritel Inns in another important way. In that case there was 
an allegation of imminent and certain tax increases directly resulting from the allegedly unlawful 
expenditure, here, there is no allegation of increased taxes or any other harm to Plaintiff. 
Plaintiff simply alleges just that a competitor received a tax credit. It does not even specifically 
allege increased competition; it simply leaves this to inference. Even so, a speculative claim of 
increased competition is legally insufficient to establish standing. See Martin v. Camas County, 
150 Idaho at 514, 248 P.3d at 1249. Lest Plaintiff contend that tax credits should be treated like 
expenditures of tax revenues, and that they are somehow injured by the depletion of the state 
treasury by these credits, there is no authority to aid that position. Those sorts of injuries are 
"conjectural and hypothetical" because tax credits do not necessarily deplete the treasury. 
DiamlerChrysler, 547 U.S. at 344. Indeed, programs like the Idaho Reimbursement Incentive 
Act are designed specifically to "spur economic activity, which in turn increases government 
revenues." Id. Plaintiff has simply failed to allege any cognizable harm that would justify its 
suit moving forward. Plaintiff has no standing to challenge the Reimbursement Incentive Act. 
CONCLUSION 
This Court should dismiss the Plaintiffs complaint in its entirety, with prejudice, under 
Idaho R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). 
II I 
II I 
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DATED this 4th day of May, 2016. 
STATE OF IDAHO 
****************************************************** 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 4th day of May, 2016, I caused to be served a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing by the following method to: 
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P.O. Box 2408 D Overnight Mail 
Eagle, ID 83616 D Facsimile: (208) 938-5482 
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Carl J. Withroe 
Deputy Attorney General 
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MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION 
TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO 
DISMISS 
Defendant. 
Plaintiff Employers Resource Management Company submits the following 
Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss under Idaho Rules of Civil 
Procedure, 12(b)(6). 
I 
EMPLOYERS RESOURCE HAS STANDING 
TO COMPLAIN ABOUT THE STATE'S SUBSIDIZATION 
OF ITS BUSINESS COMPETITOR 
A. Employers Resource has 'competitor standing' based on the 'distinct palpable 
injury' to its business as a direct result of the State's action in subsidizing its 
competitor's business by granting it a $6.5 million tax credit. 
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Employers Resource initiated this lawsuit because the Idaho Department of Commerce 
exercised its discretionary authority under the Tax Reimbursement Incentive Act to grant a 
subsidy in the form of a tax credit to Paylocity, a direct competitor of Employers Resource. The 
Complaint alleges that injury to Employers Resource. The Complaint also alleges that all Idaho 
taxpayers have been and will be injured by similar unconstitutional actions of the Department of 
Commerce in granting tax subsidies to Paylocity and other companies of its choice under the 
auspices of the Tax Reimbursement Incentive Act. The Defendant's motion to dismiss is based 
entirely on the assertion that the Complaint alleges only a claim of 'taxpayer standing.' That is 
inaccurate because the Complaint also alleges a direct economic injury to Employers Resource. 
Employers Resource' standing is predicated on the unique, 'distinct palpable injury' that 
Employers Resource has and will suffer by reason of the actions of the Department of Commerce 
in granting a tax credit to its direct competitor, Paylocity._ That injury to Employers Resource is 
not a 'generalized grievance shared by all or a large class of citizens.' It is an imminent injury 
unique to Employers Resource. Its right to bring this lawsuit arises under the doctrine of 
'Competitor Standing,' not 'Taxpayer Standing.' 
The Plaintiff's Complaint alleges competitor standing in the form of a distinct palpable 
injury to Employers Resource that is a direct result of the tax credit subsidy granted to Paylocity 
by the Department of Commerce. Paragraphs 8 and 9 state: 
"8. Plaintiff Employers Resource Management Company, an Idaho 
Corporation, ("Employers Resource") is one of Idaho's top privately-held companies. 
Recently, the EAC granted Paylocity, an Illinois company, and one of Employers' 
Resource competitors, a 28% credit against its future tax liabilities in return for its 
promise to create 'new jobs' in Boise. The estimated tax credit granted to Paylocity by the 
EAC is approximately $6,500,000. 
9. The State ofldaho's grant of a massive tax break to Paylocity has given it 
an unfair economic advantage over Employers' Resource, including the ability to lure 
Plaintiffs' employees away from Employers' Resource." 
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Admittedly, the harms suffered by Employers Resource as a result of the State's actions 
could have been alleged in greater detail. However, the Plaintiff contends that the allegations in 
the Complaint are sufficient to satisfy the doctrine of competitor standing. In the event that the 
Court concludes that the allegations of harm to Employers Resource are insufficient, Plaintiff 
requests leave of court to file an amended Complaint setting out those allegations in detail. 
B. The applicable legal standard. 
The facts alleged show that Employers Resource meets the jurisdictional requirements for 
standing in this case. Since the Defendant's motion is for judgment on the pleadings rather than 
summary judgment, the Court reviews the pleadings to determine whether standing exists. In 
Young v. City of Ketchum, 137 Idaho 102, 103, 44 P.3d 1157 (Idaho 2002), the Court set out the 
applicable standard. 
"When we review an order dismissing a case pursuant to I.R.C.P. 12(b)(6), the 
non-moving party is entitled to have all inferences from the record viewed in his favor. 
Orthman v. Idaho Power Co., 126 Idaho 960,961,895 P.2d 561,562 (1995) (citing Miles 
v. Idaho Power Co., 116 Idaho 635,637, 778 P.2d 757, 759 (1989)). After drawing 
all inferences in the non-moving party's favor, we then ask whether a claim for relief has 
been stated. Id. "The issue is not whether the plaintiff will ultimately prevail, but whether 
the party is entitled to offer evidence to support the claims." Id. ( citations and internal 
quotations omitted). 
Standing focuses on the party seeking relief and not on the issues the party wishes 
to have adjudicated. Van Valkenburgh at 124, 15 P.3d at 1132; Boundary Backpackers v. 
Boundary County, 128 Idaho 371,375,913 P.2d 1141, 1145 (1996)(quotingMiles at 
639, 778 P.2d at 761). To satisfy the case or controversy requirement of standing, a 
litigant must "allege or demonstrate an injury in fact and a substantial likelihood the relief 
requested will prevent or redress the claimed injury." Id. (citations omitted). This requires 
a showing of a "distinct palpable injury" and "fairly traceable causal connection between -
the claimed injury and the challenged conduct." Miles at 639, 778 P.2d at 761 (internal 
quotations omitted). But even if a showing can be made of an injury in fact, standing may 
be denied when the asserted harm is a generalized grievance shared by all or a large class 
of citizens. Id. (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 95 S. Ct. 2197, 45 L.Ed.2d 343 
(1975)); Miles, 116 Idaho at 641, 778 P.2d at 763 (stating "a citizen and taxpayer may not 
challenge a governmental enactment where the injury is one suffered by all citizens and 
taxpayers alike."); Bopp v. City ofSandpoin(, 110 Idaho 488, 716 P.2d 1260 (1986); 
Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss 3 
000026
Greer v. Lewiston Golf & Country Club, Inc., 81 Idaho 393,342 P.2d 719 (1959). Id, at 
104-105. 
C. Employers Resource has standing based on a competitive injury resulting from 
the Department of Commerce's action that changed market conditions. 
The United States Supreme Court has applied the doctrine of competitor standing to the 
claims of an Idaho company harmed by federal executive action on tax policy that benefitted its 
competitors. In Clinton v. City o/New York, 524 U.S. 417, 426-427, 118 S. Ct. 2091 (1998), the 
U.S. Supreme Court held that Snake River Potato Growers, Inc., an Idaho cooperative, ("Snake 
River") had "competitor standing" to challenge the President's cancellation of a tax benefit that 
put Snake River at a disadvantage with its competitors. The Supreme Court discussed the 
application of the doctrine to Snake River as follows: 
"Appellee Snake River Potato Growers, Inc. (Snake River) was formed in May 
1997 to assist Idaho potato farmers in marketing their crops and stabilizing prices, in 
part through a strategy of acquiring potato processing facilities that will allow the 
members of the cooperative to retain revenues otherwise payable to third-party 
processors. At that time, Congress was considering the amendment to the capital gains 
tax that was expressly intended to aid farmers' cooperatives in the purchase of processing 
facilities, and Snake River had concrete plans to take advantage of the amendment if 
passed. Indeed, appellee Mike Cranney, acting on behalf of Snake River, was engaged in 
negotiations with the owner of an Idaho potato processor that would have qualified for 
the tax benefit under the pending legislation, but these negotiations terminated when the 
President canceled § 968. Snake River is currently considering the possible purchase of 
other processing facilities in Idaho if the President's cancellation is reversed. Based on 
these facts, the District Court concluded that the Snake River plaintiffs were injured by 
the President's cancellation of §968, as they "lost the benefit of being on equal footing 
with their competitors and will likely have to pay more to purchase processing facilities 
now that the sellers will not [be] able to take advantage of section 968's tax breaks." Id., 
at 177.1 
The Court pointed out that Snake River had competitor standing because it had a 
"personal stake" in having an actual injury redressed rather than an abstract and widely dispersed 
1 Court's citation is to City of New York v. Clinton, 985 F.Supp. 168, 177 (D.D.C. 1998) 
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institutional injury, and its injury arose directly from the President's action in cancelling the tax 
benefit. The Court noted: 
"The Snake River farmers' cooperative also suffered an immediate injury when the 
President canceled the limited tax benefit that Congress had enacted to facilitate the 
acquisition of processing plants. Three critical facts identify the specificity and the 
importance of that injury. First, Congress enacted§ 968 for the specific purpose of 
providing a benefit to a defined category of potential purchasers of a defined category of 
assets. The members of that statutorily defined class received the equivalent of a statutory 
"bargaining chip" to use in carrying out the congressional plan to facilitate their 
purchase of such assets. Second, the President selected §968 as one of only two tax 
benefits in the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 that should be canceled. The cancellation 
· rested on his determination that the use of those bargaining chips would have a 
significant impact on the federal budget deficit. Third, the Snake River cooperative was 
organized for the very purpose of acquiring processing facilities, it had concrete plans to 
utilize the benefits of § 968, and it was engaged in ongoing negotiations with the owner 
of a processing plant who had expressed an interest in structuring a tax-deferred sale 
when the President canceled § 968. Moreover, it is actively searching for other 
processing facilities for possible future purchase if the President's cancellation is 
reversed; and there are ample processing facilities in the State that Snake River may be 
able to purchase. By depriving them of their statutory bargaining chip, the cancellation 
inflicted a sufficient likelihood of economic injury to establish standing under our 
precedents. See, e.g., Investment Company Institute v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617,620 (1971); 
3K. Davis & R. Pierce, Administrative Law Treatise 13-14 (3d ed. 1994) ("The Court 
routinely recognizes probable economic injury resulting from [governmental actions] 
that alter competitive conditions as sufficient to satisfy the [Article III 'injury-in-fact' 
requirement] .... It follows logically that any ... petitioner who is likely to suffer 
economic injury as a result of [governmental action] that changes market conditions 
satisfies this part of the standing test'')." (emphasis added) Id. at 432-433. 
In United States Telecom Association v. Federal Communications Commission, 295 F.3d 
1326, 1331 (D.C. Cir. 2002), the Court held that U.S. Telecom Association ("USTA") members 
had standing to challenge an FCC order finding that its competitor, the Iowa Communications 
Network, was a common carrier and therefore eligible for federal subsidies to provide discounted 
telecommunication services in competition with USTA. The Court stated: 
" USTA contends that the FCC's order injures its members by making ICN eligible for a 
subsidy that permits it to offer lower prices for the same telecommunications services. 
We have repeatedly recognized that parties "suffer constitutional injury in fact when 
agencies ... allow increased competition" against them. Louisiana Energy & Power 
Auth. v. FERC, 141 F.3d 364,367 (D.C. Cir. 1998); see, e.g., Wabash Valley Power Ass'n 
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v. FERC, 268 F.3d 1105, 1113 (D.C. Cir.2001); MD Pharm., Inc. v. Drug Enforcement 
Admin., 133 F.3d 8, 11 (D.C. Cir. 1998). And we have likewise recognized that 
regulatory decisions that permit subsidization of some participants in a market can have 
the requisite injurious impact on those participants' competitors. See Exxon Co., US.A, v. 
FERC, 182 F.3d 30, 43 (D.C. Cir. 1999); Liquid Carbonic, 29 F.3d at 701." 
The doctrine of competitor standing has been applied to various forms of economic 
injury. Thus, the Court in Sherley v. Sebelius, 610 F.3d 69, 72 (D.C. Cir. 2010) noted that, 
"The doctrine of competitor standing addresses the first requirement by recognizing that 
economic actors " suffer [an] injury in fact when agencies lift regulatory restrictions on 
their competitors or otherwise allow increased competition" against them. La. Energy & 
Power Auth. v. FERC, 141 F.3d 364, 367 (D.C.Cir.1998); accord New World Radio, Inc. 
v. FCC, 294 F.3d 164, 172 (D.C.Cir.2002) (" basic law of economics" that increased 
competition leads to actual injury); see also Canadian Lumber Trade Alliance v. United 
States, 517 F.3d 1319, 1332 (Fed.Cir.2008) (doctrine of competitor standing" relies on 
economic logic to conclude that a plaintiff will likely suffer an injury-in-fact when the 
government acts in a way that increases competition or aids the plaintiffs competitors" ). 
The form of that injury may vary; for example, a seller facing increased competition 
may lose sales to rivals, or be forced to lower its price or to expend more resources to 
achieve the same sales, all to the detriment of its bottom line. Because increased 
competition almost surely injures a seller in one form or another, he need not wait 
until "allegedly illegal transactions ... hurt {him] competitively" before challenging the 
regulatory (or,for that matter: the deregulatory) governmental decision that increases 
competition. La. Energy, 141 F.3d at 367." (emphasis added) 
B~cause the US Telecom case was decided by summary judgment motion rather than · 
judgment on the pleadings, USTA had submitted member affidavits showing that it was ready, 
willing and able to compete with ICN. The Court remarked that these affidavits were sufficient 
to satisfy the remaining two requirements of constitutional standing, noting: 
" ... [T]he competitive injury suffered by UST A's members is fairly traceable to the FCC's 
decision to render ICN eligible for the subsidy, and that injury would likely be 
redressed by a favorable decision of this court vacating the FCC's order. See High Plains 
Wireless, L.P. v. FCC, 276 F.3d 599,605 (D.C. Cir. 2002); Exxon, 182 F.3d at 43; 
Liquid Carbonic, 29 F.3d at 701. We therefore conclude that USTA has constitutional 
standing to seek judicial review of the order on behalf of its members." 
The Complaint in this case alleges that Employers Resource has and will suffer an 
imminent injury that is fairly traceable to the Department of Commerce's grant of a tax credit to 
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Employers' competitor, Paylocity, subsidizing its business and providing it with a competitive 
advantage over Employers Resource. The suit seeks declaratory relief in the form of a judgment 
declaring that the grant of tax credits to Paylocity and other companies by the Department of 
Commerce under the Tax Reimbursement Incentive Act violates the provisions of the Idaho 
Constitution. That relief will fully redress Employers' injury. 
The Defendant cited Martin v. Camas County ex.rel. Bd. Comm'rs, 150 Idaho 508, 248 
P.3d 1243 (2011) for the proposition that "increased competition alone is insufficient to confer 
standing." Martin involved a landowner's complaint about a zoning ordinance. In ruling that 
Martin did not have standing, the Court noted that "Martin cites to no authority in support of his 
argument that a comprehensive county-wide change in zoning designations (wherein some 
parcels ofland receive a higher zoning density classification than they previously enjoyed) 
constitutes an injury to a property owner, absent some resultant specific and traceable harm. 
( emphasis added) Martin argues that the upzoning of approximately 20,000 acres of property in 
:Camas County wili'decrease the value of his property for development, because of the increase 
in supply.") 
The proposition cited from Martin has no relevance to our case. Employers Resource has 
not complained that the State of Idaho is encouraging competition. Employers Resource 
welcomes fair competition. Its complaint is that the State of Idaho is partnering with Employers 
Resource's competitor, subsidizing its business by unconstitutional means and at taxpayer 
expense, which puts Employers' Resource business at an unfair competitive economic 
disadvantage. While Martin had only a generalized grievance based on speculation, Employers 
Resource has alleged a specific traceable harm to it resulting from the action of the State in 
subsidizing its competitor. 
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When the Idaho Supreme Court considered the standing of the Coeur D'Alene Tribe to 
petition for a Writ of Mandamus compelling the Secretary of State to certify Senate Bill 1011 as 
law after the Governor failed to return his veto within the five-day deadline under the Idaho 
Constitution, the Court pointed out that the presence of a "distinct and palpable injury" would 
have distinguished the Tribe's claim based on competitive disadvantage from the Martin 
decision.2 The State had argued that the Tribe had not shown how the law repealing 'historical' 
horse race wagering impacted the Tribe's gaming activities. The Court opined: 
"The Tribe claims that it is particularly harmed due to its distinct rights under the 
Indian Gaming Regulatory Act ("IGRA"). See 25 U.S.C. § 2701, et seq. Although the 
Tribe has established a unique and protected right towards gaming in the state, it fails to 
present sufficient facts as to how S.B. 1011 impacts the Tribe's ability to benefit from 
gaming going forward. The Tribe correctly concedes that this Court "has never held that 
increased competition alone is sufficient to confer standing." Martin v. Camas Cnty. ex 
rel. Bd. Comm'rs, 150 Idaho 508,514,248 P.3d 1243, 1249 (2011). Without 
providing facts to show actual or imminent losses of profit or rights greater than the 
average citizen, the Tribe has not demonstrated a "distinct and palpable" injury sufficient 
to confer standing. Troutner, 142 Idaho at 391, 128 P.3d at 928." 
The Complaint in this case alleges facts that show that Employers Resource has and will 
be economically injured by the action of the Department of Commerce in granting its competitor 
a tax credit to subsidize its business in Idaho. Paylocity has agreed to locate its business in Boise 
based on the Department's agreement to give it a $6.5 million tax credit. Employers Resource 
cannot compete on the same level with a company in partnership with the State. Its economic 
injury is certain to occur, imminent, and unique to Employers Resource. Its damages are and will 
not be shared by the average citizen or suffered on a generalized basis. On these facts, Employers 
Resource has standing to pursue its claim for declaratory relief against the Idaho Department of 
Commerce. 
2 IN THE MATTER OF THE VERIFIED PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS. 
COEUR D'ALENE TRIBE, Petitioner, v. LAWERENCE DENNEY, Secretary of State of the 
State ofldaho, in his official capacity, Respondent. No. 43169 Supreme Court ofldaho 
November 20, 2015, 2015 Opinion No. 106 
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The Defendant's Motion should therefore be denied. 
Respectfully Submitted, 
·stT. Troupis 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
Employers Resource Management Company, 
an Idaho Corporation 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 20th day of May, 2016, I served a true and correct copy of the 
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Steven L. 0 lsen 
Carl J. Withroe 
Deputy Attorney General 
954 W. Jefferson Street, 2nd Floor 
P.O. Box 83720 
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MOTION FOR LEA VE TO 
AMEND COMPLAINT 
COMES NOW Plaintiff, Employers Resource Management Company, an Idaho 
Corporation; by and through its counsel of record, Christ T. Troupis of Troupis Law 
Office, P.A., and hereby move this Court pursuant to Rule 15 of the Idaho Rules of Civil 
Procedure, for an order granting leave to amend the complaint in this matter to include 
additional allegations of the damages that the Plaintiff has and will incur by reason of the 
actions of the Defendant as presently alleged in the Complaint. A true and accurate copy 
of the Amended Complaint is attached to the Declaration of Christ Troupis as Exhibit 
"A." 
MOTION TO AMEND COMPLAINT - 1 
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... ..... , 
This motion is made on the grounds that the requested amendment is necessary to 
set out the allegations of damages in sufficient detail to provide adequate notice to the 
Defendant of the claims of the Plaintiff in this action. 
This motion is further based upon the records and files herein, the Declaration of 
Christ T. Troupis and Memorandum in Support of Motion to Amend Complaint filed 
concurrently herewith. 
Oral argument is requested on this motion. 
DATED This .J!f_ day of May, 2016. 
TROUPIS LAW OFFICE, P.A., 
By: 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the }!/day of May, 2016, a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing document was served as follows: 
Steven L. Olsen 
Carl J. Withroe 
Deputy Attorney General . 
954 W. Jefferson Street, 2nd Floor 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, Idaho 83720-0100 
MOTION TO AMEND COMPLAINT - 2 
~ First Class Mail 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[ ] Facsimile (208) 336-9712 
[ ] Overnight Delivery 
Christ T. Troupis 
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, 
Christ T. Troupis, ISB # 4549 
TROUPIS LAW OFFICE 
801 E. State Street, Ste 50 
POBox2408 
Eagle, Idaho 83616 
Telephone: 208/ 938-5584 
Facsimile: 208/ 938-5482 · 
Email: ctroupis@troupislaw.com 
NO. 1~0 0 FILED A.M.--t------.-1P.M ___ _ 
MAY 2 6 2016 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk 
By ALESIA BUTTS 
DEPUTY 
Attorney for Plaintiff Employers Resource, an Idaho Corporation 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR ADA COUNTY 
EMPLOYERS RESOURCE 
MANAGEMENT COMPANY, 
An Idaho Corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MEGAN. RONK, in her capacity· as 
Director of the IDAHO 
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, · 
Defendant. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Case No.: CV OC 1605467 
DECLARATION OF CHRIST 
TROUPIS IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION FOR LEA VE TO 
AMEND COMPLAINT 
I, Ghrist T. Troupis, pursuant to I.R.C.P. 7(d) and LC.§ 9-1406, declare as follows: 
1. I am the a~omey of record for the Plaintiff in the above entitled matter, I am over 
the age of 18, I have personal knowledge to the facts stated herein, and I am competent to testify 
to the same. 
2. Attached hereto is Plaintiffs proposed First Amended Complaint. 
3. It is necessary for the Plaintiff to file the Amended Complaint in order to describe 
in greater detail the nature and elements of the damages claimed by the Plaintiff to have resulted 
from the Defendant's actions. 
Declaration of Christ Troupis 1 
000038
4. The lawsuit is at its earliest stage and no prejudice can result to the Defendant 
from permitting this Amendment, since no discovery has been propounded and no trial date has 
been scheduled. 
5. I declare under penalty of perjury pursuant to the laws of the State of Idaho that 
the foregoing is true and correct. 
DATED this .l:!f._ day of May, 2016. 
Christ T. Troupis 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 2!f day of May, 2016, a true and correct copy.of the 
. foregoing document was served as follows: 
Steven L. Olsen 
Carl J. Withroe 
Deputy Attorney General 
954 W. Jefferson Street, 2nd Floor 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, Idaho 83720-0100 
Declaration of Christ Troupis 
~ First Class Mail 
[ ] . Hand Delivery 
[ ] Facsimile (208) 336-9712 [ J 9vernight Delivery 
~~ st . roup1s 
2 
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t .~ 
Christ T. Troupis, ISB # 4549 
TROUPIS LAW OFFICE 
801 E. State Street, Ste 50 
POBox2408 
Eagle, Idaho 83616 
Telephone: 208/ 938-5584 
Facsimile: 208/ 938-5482 
Email: ctroupis@troupislaw.com 
Attorney for Plaintiff Employers Resource, an Idaho Corporation 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR ADA COUNTY 
EMPLOYERS RESOURCE 
MANAGEMENT COMPANY, 
An Idaho Corporation, 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
Case No.: CV OC 1605467 
FIRST AMENDED COlVIPLAINT 
FOR DECLARATORY 
MEGAN RONK, in her capacity as_ 
Director of the IDAHO 
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, 
RELIEF 
Defendant. 
COME NOW THE PLAINTIFF EMPLOYERS RESOURC_E OF AMERICA, INC., 
an Idaho <;orporation, by and through its attorney, Christ T. Troupis, and for its cau~e of action 
against Defendant, alleges as follows: 
1. This action arises under the provisions of Article II, § 1, Article III, § 1, and Article 
VII, §5 of the Idaho Constitution. Article II, §1 provides: 
The powers of the government of this state are divided into three distinct departments, the 
legislative, executive and judicial; and no person or collection of persons charged 
with the exercise of powers properly belonging to one of these departments shall exercise 
any powers properly belonging to either of the others, except as in this 
constitution expressly directed or permitted. 
First Amended Complaint for Declaratory Relief 1 
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2. Article 3, §1 of the Idaho Constitution provides that: "The legislative power of the state 
shall be vested in a senate and house of representatives." 
3. Article VII, §5 of the Idaho Constitution, provides that "all taxes shall be uniform upon 
the same class of subjects ... [and] the legislature may allow such exemptions from taxation from 
time to time as shall seem necessary and just.. .11 
4. The Idaho Supreme Court has held that the functions of the legislature are to be 
exercised by it alone. The legislature has plenary authority in all matters of taxation except those 
prohibited or limited by the constitution. Union Pacific R. Co. v. Board o/Tax Appeals, 103 
Idaho 808, 654 P.2d 901 (1982) 
5. In 2014, the Idaho legislature passed the Idaho Reimbursement Incentive Act, 
(".I~") which was then.amended in 2015. The IRIA authorizes tax credits !O be issued by the 
Director of the Department of Commerce to a qualified business entity. To qualify for the tax 
credit, a business entity files an application with the Department of Commerce. The application 
is reviewed by the Director solely to determine if all the information required by the statute is 
present. The completed application is then reviewed by an Economic Advisory Council ("EAC") 
within the Dept. of Commerce, whose members are appointed by the Governor. The EAC is 
. . 
established under Idaho Code §67-4704. 
6. This lawsuit is brought on the grounds that the Idaho Department of Commerce, 
by and through the actions of its Director and members of the Economic Advisory Council, has 
violated and is continuing to violate Article II, §1, Article III, §1 and Article VII, §5 of the Idaho 
Constitution of the Idaho Constitution by exercising non-delegable legislative power vested 
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. ( 
solely in the Idaho Senate and House of Representatives, with respect to the determination of 
Idaho's tax policy and the issuance of tax exemptions and/or credits to some Idaho taxpayers. 
7. Plaintiff seeks relief in the form of a declaratory judgment that the actions of the 
Department of Commerce through its Director and Economic Advisory Council complained of 
herein, exceed the constitutional authority of the Executive Branch of Idaho State Government, 
and that Department, and that all such actions therefore should be declared null and void. 
8. Plaintiff Employers Resource Management Company, an Idaho Corporation, 
("Employers Resource") is one ofldaho's top privately-held companies. Recently, the EAC 
granted Paylocity, an Illinois company, and one of Employers' Resource competitors, a 28% 
credit against its future tax liabilities in return fo~ its promise to create 'new jobs' in Boise. The 
estimated tax credit granted to Paylocity by the EAC is approximately $6,500,000. 
9. The St~te c;,f Idaho's grant of a massive tax break to Paylocity has given it an 
unfair economic advantage over Employers' Resource, mcluding the ability to lure Plaintiffs' 
employees away from Employers' Resource. 
10. Employers Resource has and will suffer damages as a direct and proximate result 
of the actions of the State Department of Commerce alleged herein. Those damages include the 
following: 
a) Paylocity is a web-based company. In anticipation.of the web requirements to 
effectivelyy compete against Paylocity in Idaho, Employers Resource has incurred additional 
expenses for internet competitive software; 
b) Since Paylocity's receipt of tax credits is based in part on the number of 
employees it hires, Employers Resource expects that its key employees will be targeted by 
Paylocity because of their training, experience, and familiarity with Employers' existing Idaho 
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customer base. Employers' will incur additional expense in salaries and other benefits to retain its 
key employees; 
c) Employers' anticipate the need to protect its existing Idaho business since 
Paylocity can afford to undercut Employers' pricing, in part due to its favorable tax treatment. 
Employers will incur expenses in advertising and marketing expenses to retain its clients; 
11. The discretionary administration of the Tax Reimbursement Incentive Program as 
applied to Employers' Resource's business damages Employers Resource and other Idaho 
businesses in the following ways: 
a) By rewarding the cannibalization of existing Idaho businesses by new entrants 
into the Idaho business market; . 
b) By distorting the Idaho labor market through subsidization of salaries paid by 
chosen companies to the detriment of exist~g Idaho businesses, including Employers. 
c) By incentivizing Employers Resource and other existing Idaho businesses to 
relocate their principal offices to other states offering similar tax incentives to out of state 
businesses; 
d) By penalizing Idaho companies with established business in 'niche' markets; 
e) By pitting Counties and Municipalities against each other to compete for new 
business by offering discretionary and arbitrary tax breaks. 
12. Defendant Megan Ronk is the Director of the Idaho Department of Commerce 
and is named in that official capacity. 
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION 
(For Declaratory Relief) 
13. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates by reference the allegations of Paragraphs 1-
12, as though set forth herein in full. 
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14. The Idaho Constitution vests all taxing power in the Legislature. This plenary 
authority of the Legislature is not delegable, and forbids a delegation of unrestricted and 
· unguided taxing power. 
15. The Idaho Department of Commerce is an agency within the Executive Branch of 
Idaho State Government. Pursuant to Article II, § 1 of the Idaho Constitution, all agencies within 
the Executive Branch are prohibited from exercising any of the powers reserved to the 
Legislative or the Judicial Branch of Idaho State Government. 
16. In or about 2014, the Idaho Legislature enacted Idaho Code §67-4739 which sets 
out statutory requirements for a business to qualify for a refundable tax credit from the State of 
Idaho. That sta~te provides: 
"(1) A business entity may claim a refundable tax credit for creating a minimum number 
of new jobs in the state of Idaho. In order to be·considered for participation, an 
applicant or its designated representative must submit an application to the director 
and shall include: · 
(a) A complete description of the proposed project and the economic benefit that 
will accrue to the·state as a result of the project; 
(b) A description or explanation of whether the project will occur or how it will be 
altered if the tax credit application is denied by the council; 
( c) Proof of a community match; 
( d) A letter from the- tax commission confirming that the applicant is in good 
standing in the state ofldaho and is not in unresolved arrears in the payment of 
any state tax or fee administer~d by the tax commission; 
( e) A detailed statement with an estimate of Idaho goods and services to be 
consumed or purchased by the applicant during the term; 
(f) Known or expected detriments to the state or existing industries in the state; 
(g) An anticipated project inception date and proposed schedule of progress; 
(h) Proposed performance requirements and measurements that must be met prior to 
issuance of the tax credit; 
(i) A detailed description of the proposed capital investment; 
G) A detailed description of jobs to be created, an approximation of the number of 
such jobs to be created and the projected average wage to be paid for such jobs;· 
(k) A detailed description of the estimated new state tax revenues to be generated by 
the project; 
(1) Identification of any individual or entity included within the application that is 
entitled to a rebate pursuant to section 63-3641 or 63-4408, Idaho Code, or is 
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required to obtain a separate seller's permit pursuant to chapter 36, title 63, 
Idaho Code; and 
(m)The federal employer identification or social security number for each individual 
or entity stated as the business entity in the agreement. 
(2) Upon satisfaction by the director that all requirements are met pursuant to this 
chapter, the director shall submit such application to the council [Economic Advisory 
Council]. The council shall review the application, may request additional 
information and shall approve or reject the application. An approval or rejection from 
the council shall not be considered a contested case pursuant to chapter 52, title 67, 
Idaho Code; provided, however, that nothing in this section shall prohibit an 
aggrieved applicant from seeking judicial review as provided in chapter 52, title 67, 
Idaho Code. 
(3) If the council approves the application, the council shall instruct the director to enter 
into an agreement with the applicant with the terms of the council's approval. If the 
council rejects an application, the applicant may reapply with a new application." 
17. The only requiremen~ that the legislature included in.Idaho. Code §67-4 73 9 for a 
business to obtain EAC approval of a tax credit application, apart from providing information to 
the Direct<:>r of the Department of Commerce, is the creation of "new jobs." In order ~o ~laim the 
tax credit, an entity must create a minimum number of new jobs in the state ofldaho. "Minimum 
new jobs,, is defined in Idaho Code §67-4738(11) as "not less than :twenty (20) such jobs over 
the term of the project if created within a rural community, or not less than fifty (50) such jobs 
over the term of the project if created within an urban community." 
18. Idaho Code §67-4739(1)(a) - (m) specifies information required to be provided as 
part of the tax credit application process. However, in enacting this statute, the Idaho Legislature 
did not establish standards, guidelines, or requirements as to how or whether this information is 
to be used in the process of approving an application for issuance of a tax credit. Further, the 
statute does not mandate that the EAC issue any required factual findings in support of the 
approval or disapproval of an applicant's request for a tax credit. Without such objective or even 
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subjective standards in place, all decisions of the EAC are for all practical purposes, exempt 
from substantive review by the Judicial Branch ofldaho State Government. 
19. Under the provisions ofldaho Code §67-4739, the EAC exercises complete 
discretion in determining whether to grant or deny an application. The determination that an 
entity will create the required number of 'new jobs' is at once arbitrary and capricious, in that the 
Council alone evaluates information submitted with no required objective criteria or findings, 
and has unlimited discretion to grant or deny any application regardless of the information 
submitted. 
20. The Director of the Department of Commerce has yielded all authority to the 
EAC with regard to _the grant or denial of tax credits. The_ Director's sole duty is to determine 
whether the application is complete. If so, the Director is required to submit the application to the 
EAC, whose decision is conclusive, and whose discretion is unlimited. 
21. . Although provision has been made for judicial rev1ew of a rejected application by 
the aggrieved applicant, the law provides that a denial is not considered a II contested cas_e, 11 and 
the law with regard to appeal of an administrative agency decision requires the Court to defer to 
the agency's exercise of discretionary authority. So, as a practical matter, there is no judicial 
remedy to an ~ggrieved applicant. 
22. The only purported limit on the EAC's discretionary authority.to grant a tax credit 
to a business is the requirement that a business entity create 'new jobs.' However, even with 
respect to that one requirement, the Idaho Legislature did not enact any "standards, guidelines, 
restrictions or qualifications" in the IRIA. As a result, the EAC has virtually unlimited 
discretionary authority to determine whether an entity qualifies for favorable tax treatment, and 
the same unlimited discretionary authority to deny such tax relief to other selected business 
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,, .. 't ' 
entities. Without such objective standards, the exercise of EAC's grant of authority is subject to 
political favoritism, corruption and cronyism. 
23. Plaintiff is informed and believes that the Idaho Department of Commerce, by and 
through the EAC, has and will continue to grant tax relief to selected businesses arbitrarily and 
capriciously, and by reason of these facts has and is exercising powers reserved under the Idaho 
Constitution to the Legislature and the Judiciary, and in the exercise of those powers, is violating 
Article II, § 1, Article III, § 1 and Article VII, §5 of the Idaho Constitution. 
24. Employers Resource and other Idaho businesses and taxpayers have and will 
suffer irreparable harm if the Idaho Department of Commerce, by and through the EAC, 
co~tinues to grant tax relief to some business entities and deny that relief to other entities, on an 
arbitrary and discretionary basis, in violation of the Idaho Constitution's grant of all taxing 
authority to the state Legislature. 
24. · Plaintiff is entitled .to have the Court enter its Decree Declaring that tlie ·Idaho 
Department of Comnierce· and the_ Economic Advisory Council within that Department do not 
have authority under the Idaho Constitution to administer the provisions of Idaho Code §67-
4739, and do not have constitutional authority to issue tax credits to business entities selected by 
the Department under the provisio11s of this Act, and that all actions taken by the Idaho 
Department of Comme_rce and the EAC under this statute are null and void. 
25. Plaintiff has been required to retain counsel to prosecute this action to vindicate 
the Constitutional rights of Plaintiff Employers Resource and other Idaho businesses and 
taxpayers, and therefore is entitled to recover its reasonable attorneys' fees and costs incurred 
herein. 
II 
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-WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for judgment against Defendants as follows: 
1. For a judicial decree declaring that the action of the Idaho Department of Commerce, 
by and through the Economic Advisory Council, in administering the IRIA, and 
granting tax credits, are in excess of its constitutional authority and therefore null and 
void. 
2. For attorneys' fees and costs of suit incurred herein; and 
3. For such other and further relief as the Court deems just and equitable. 
Dated: May 24, 2016 
By~~~~------
Christ T. Troupis 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
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Christ T. Troupis, ISB # 4549 
TROUPIS LAW OFFICE 
801 E. State Street, Ste 50 
POBox2408 
Eagle, Idaho 83616 
Telephone: 208/ 938-5584 
Facsimile: 208/ 938-5482 
Email: ctroupis@troupislaw.com 
NO. l()° 
A.M. 11 
FILED P.M,, ___ _ 
MAY 2 6 2016 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk 
By ALESIA BUTTS 
DEPUTY 
Attorney for Plaintiff Employers Resource, an Idaho Corporation 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR ADA COUNTY 
EMPLOYERS RESOURCE 
MANAGEMENT COMPANY, 
An Idaho Corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MEGAN RONK, in her capacity as 
Director of the IDAHO. 
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, 
Defendant. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Case No.: CV OC 1605467 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT 
OF MOTION FOR LEA VE TO 
FILE AMENDED COMPLAINT 
CONIES NOW Plaintiff, Employers Resource Management Company, an Idaho 
Corporation, by and through its counsel of record, Christ T. Troupis of Troupis Law 
Office, P.A., and hereby submit the foregoing memorandum in support of its motion to 
amend complaint. 
DISCUSSION 
Plaintiff is seeking to amend its Complaint in this matter to set out in greater 
detail the allegations of damages incurred by reason of Defendant's actions. Rule 15(a) of 
the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure provides that leave of the court to amend a pleading 
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"shall be freely given when justice so requires" (emphasis added); Clark v. Olsen, 110 
Idaho 323, 326, 715 P.2d 993, 996 (1996); Smith v. Shinn, 82 Idaho 141, 149, 350 P.2d 
348 (1960); Markstaller v. Markstaller, 80 Idaho 129,134,326 P.2d 994 (1958). 
In Smith v. Great Basin Grain Co., 98 Idaho 266, 272-73, 461 P.2d 129, 1305-06 
(1977), the Idaho Supreme Court expressly placed the burden of showing why a court 
should not grant leave to amend a complaint on the parties opposed to the amendment. 
Id. As Smith declares, the refusal to grant leave to amend without justifying reason is, 
per se, an abuse of discretion. Id. 
In the case at bar, Plaintiff has alleged that the actions of the State Department of 
Commerce in subsidizing. the business of Paylocity, a competito! of Plaintiff, by 
providing it with an Idaho tax incentive, has and will damage Plaintiff. Plaintiff seeks to 
set out the nature and descriptio~ of its d~ages in greater detail in order to provide 
notice to the Defendant of its claims. 
Defendant will not .be prejudiced by the filing of an Amended Complaint because 
the parties have ample time to respond to the amended pleading. The case is at its earliest 
stage and no discovery has been conducted. Following long-standing precedent, 
Defendants have the burde.n of showing prejudice of any kind. Absent a showing of 
prejudice, this Court should grant Plaintiffs Motion to Amend. 
DATED This _.J!/__ day of May, 2016. 
TROUPIS LAW OFFICE, P.A., 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
;,.. 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the~ day of May, 2016, a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing document was served as follows: 
Steven L. Olsen 
Carl J. Withroe 
Deputy Attorney General 
954 W. Jefferson Street, 2nd Floor 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, Idaho 83720-0100 
~ First Class Mail 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[ ] Facsimile (208) 336-9712 
[ ] Overnight Delivery 
(lpiA) 12-
Christ T. Troupis Y: 
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CARL J. WITHR0E, ISB #7051 
Deputy Attorney General 
954 W. Jefferson Street, 2nd Floor 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, ID 83720-0010 
Telephone: (208) 334-2400 
Facsimile: (208) 854-8073 
Attorney for Defendant 
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JUL 1 5 2016 
CHRISTOPHl:FI o. RICH, Clerk 
By ALESIA ESUTTS 
DEPUTY 
ORIGINAL 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
EMPLOYERS RESOURCE MANAGEMENT 
COMPANY, an Idaho Corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MEGAN RONK, in her capacity as Director of 
the IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, 
Defendant. 
) 
) Case No. CV OC 1605467 
) 
) REPLYMEMORANDUMIN 
) SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S 
) MOTION TO DISMISS 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
_________________ ) 
Plaintiff challenges as unconstitutional an important statutory program that incentivizes 
economic growth in Idaho by allowing tax credits to businesses that meet various criteria relating 
to job creation or expansion. Plaintiff is not the object of the government action at issue. In 
response to Director Ronk's motion to dismiss for lack of standing, Plaintiff contends not that the 
program's treatment of it deprives it of a legally recognized interest, but rather, that the 
program's treatment of another entity causes injury to its competitive position in the 
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marketplace. The company tries to show injury by alleging that it anticipates it may make 
certain business decisions as a result of what it thinks that other entity may do. 
Plaintiff's argument presumes a legally protected interest in its competitive position in 
the marketplace, which it does not have. Additionally, the speculative harm, self-inflicted and 
too attenuated and contingent to meet the standing burden, infects Plaintiff's case with a number 
of defects that require it be dismissed. 
l. Plaintiff's original complaint raised a generalized grievance about the program, 
claiming that taxpayers would be harmed. Compl. p. 7. It also alleged that the grant of a tax 
credit to a c~mpetitor gave the competitor an "unfair economic advantage." Id at 3. The 
complaint that taxpayers would be injured must be dispatched because there is no taxpayer 
standing in Idaho. Memo. in Support of Def. 's Mot. Dismiss p. 5; see also Idaho Sch. for Equal 
Educational Opportunity v. Evans, 123 Idaho 573, 850 P.2d 724 (1993). And the competitor 
argument does not satisfy standing requirements either, because the Idaho Supreme Court has 
"never held that increased competition alone is sufficient to confer standing." Memo. in Support 
of Def.'s Mot. Dismiss pp. 5-6; Martin v. Camas County, 150 Idaho 508, 248 P.3d 1243 (2011). 
Plaintiff failed to allege facts that showed anything other than a competitor received a tax credit 
under the Reimbursement Incentive Act. Its claim of harm was pure guess. With nothing more 
than a bare claim of generalized increased competition, the Complaint failed to satisfy the 
requirements for standing: injury in fact, a sufficient causal connection between the injury and 
the conduct at issue, and a substantial likelihood that injunctive relief will redress the claimed 
injury. See Bagley v. Thomason, 149 Idaho 806,807,241 P.3d 979, 980 (2010). 
2. But no, Plaintiff says, it does have standing, under the "competitor standing" 
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doctrine. Memo. in Opp'n to Def. 's Mot. Dismiss p. 2. 1 Plaintiff's argument goes as follows: A 
competitor received a tax credit under the program at issue, the Idaho Reimbursement Incentive 
Act. Plaintiff says that the competitor is an internet-based company, and so Plaintiff had to buy 
"competitive software" to keep up. First Am. Compl. Deel. Relief p. 3. And, since the 
competitor's tax credit is determined in part based on the number of employees it hires, Plaintiff 
"expects" that the competitor will seek to lure its "key employees" away. Id. Plaintiff 
"anticipate[s] the need to protect its existing Idaho business since [the competitor] can afford to 
undercut [Plaintiff's] pricing .... " Id. at 4. So, it says, it "will incur expenses in advertising and 
marketing expenses to retain its clients." Id. 
More generally, Plaintiff complains that the program "reward[s] the cannibalization of 
existing Idaho businesses," "distort[s] the Idaho labor market" by "incentivizing [Plaintiff] and 
other existing Idaho businesses to relocate their principal offices" to states with similar tax 
incentives, "penalize[es] Idaho companies with established business in 'niche' markets," and 
"pit[s] Counties and Municipalities against each other .... " Id. 
Based on the tax credit to Plaintiff's competitor, Plaintiff alleges that it just can't 
compete. Mem. in Opp'n to Def.'s Mot. Dismiss p. 8. These allegations, Plaintiff says, establish 
that it will suffer certain and imminent harm to its competitive interests in the market and that the 
harm it will suffer is unique to it. Id. 
3. Plaintiff argues that these al~egations permit it to sue Director Ronk under the 
"competitor standing" rule. The company does not describe this rule, but offers three federal 
cases (and no Idaho cases) as examples of how it applies. Assuming the doctrine applies in 
1 Plaintiff recognized that its factual allegations could have been presented in greater detail, and 
seeks to amend its complaint to add some detail it thinks will pass standing muster. Whichever 
complaint the Court considers, the result should be the same. 
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Idaho (but see Martin, 150 Idaho 514, 248 P.3d at 1249), it does not apply the way Plaintiff 
thinks it does, and it does not apply in this case. 
4. Competitor standing falls under the injury-in-fact prong. Its habitat is largely the 
D. C. Circuit, which is the primary enclave for litigation challenging things the federal 
government does. See John G. Roberts, Jr., What Makes the D.C. Circuit Different? A 
Historical View, 92 Va. L. Rev. 375, 376-77 (2006). And lots of these challenges involve highly 
regulated industries regulated by an alphabet soup of agencies-the EPA, FERC, the NLRB, the 
FAA, and the FCC, to name a few-under highly complex and detailed rules. These agencies 
may set rates, establish criteria for participation in a market, or otherwise manage the small 
details of participating in a particular industry. Spawning from challenges to federal agency 
conduct by competitors alleging that the agency that controls so much of the market, the D.C. 
Circuit postulates that companies have a protectable interest in their position in the marketplace 
and that "economic actors 'suffer [an] injury in fact when agencies lift restrictions on their 
competitors or o.therwise allow increased competition' against them." Shirley v. Sebelius, 610 
F.3d 69, 72 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (quoting La. Energy & Power Auth. v. FERC, 141 F.3d 364, 367 
(D.C. Cir. 1998)). The theory is that a business's protectable position in the marketplace is 
assumed to be injured when government action that increases competition is certain and 
imminent. 
But, a party's obligation to show injury-in-fact is not absolved simply by applying the 
coµipetitor standing label to its claim. The increase in competition must be "imminent." See 
Shirley, 610 F.3d at 73-74 (increase in competition was "imminent"; La. Energy & Power Auth., 
141 F.3d at 367 (same). The D.C. Circuit has declined, for example, to find competitor standing 
where there was only "some vague probability" of increased competition and "a still lower 
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probability" of injury from that competition. DEK Energy Co. v. FERC, 248 F.3d 1192, 1196 
(D.C. Cir. 2001). And the concreteness requirement remains. The less imminent the injury is, 
the more difficult time a plaintiff has showing concreteness. As a general standing principle, the 
U.S. Supreme Court has "repeatedly reiterated that 'threatened injury must be certainly 
impending to constitute injury in fact,' and that '[a]llegations of possible future injury are not 
sufficient." Clapper v. Amnesty International, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1147 (2013) (quoting 'Whitmore 
v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 158 (1990)). 
5. Challenges by plaintiffs who are not the object of the government regulation-
like in this case-face other difficulties. The U.S. Supreme Court has made clear that "when the 
plaintiff is not himself the object of the government action or inaction he challenges, standing is 
not precluded but it is ordinarily 'substantially more difficult' to establish." Lujan v. Defenders 
of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 562 (1992). This is because, in such a case, "[t]he existence of one or 
more of the essential elements of standing 'depends on the unfettered choices made by 
independent actors not before the courts and whose exercise of broad and legitimate discretion 
the courts cannot presume to either control or predict .... " Id. (quoting ASARCO Inc. v. Kadish, 
490 U.S. 605, 615 (1989) (Op. of Kennedy, J.)). So, for example, the D.C. Circuit has denied 
standing where "the plaintiff seeks to change the defendant's behavior only as a means to alter 
the conduct of a third party, not before the court, who is the direct source of the plaintiffs 
injury." Common Cause v. Dep'tofEnergy, 702 F.2d 245,251 (D.C. Cir. 1983). 
Plaintiffs challenging the tax treatment of competitors have no easier go at demonstrating 
standing. The problem is in showing both imminence and concreteness; it lies in the nature of 
challenges to government treatment of someone else, and the contingent and speculative nature 
of the harm flowing from that treatment. An example of this is American Society of Travel 
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Agents, Inc. v. Blumenthal, 566 F.2d 145 (D.C. Cir. 1977). There, for-profit private travel agents 
earned their living primarily on commissions gained from selling transportation and travel-
related services in the States and abroad. Id at 148. The plaintiff travel agents in the case 
challenged the tax-exempt status of income from tax-exempt 501(c)(3) companies selling 
transportation and travel-related services-in direct competition with the travel agents. Id Just 
like Plaintiff in this case, the travel agents complained that their injury arose from the Internal 
Revenue Service's "creation of an unfair competitive atmosphere .... " Id. at 149. But that was 
not good enough to demonstrate standing. It was "too speculative." Id 
And in Fulani v. Brady, 935 F.2d 1324 (D.C. Cir. 1991), the D.C. Circuit denied standing 
to a political candidate excluded from debates hosted by a non-profit organization who sought to 
challenge the organization's tax treatment. The plaintiff rooted her challenge in competitor 
standing, but the court found her claim of injury too contingent to satisfy standing requirements. 
The court noted that the plaintiff "challenging the actions of the IRS only as a means of affecting 
the behavior of the [tax exempt debate-hosting organization]." The IRS actions "caused her 
alleged injury only due to other intervening causal factors, including the FEC's regulations, the 
[debate-hosting organization's] actions, and the anticipated behavior of other debate 
participants." Id. 1330-31. See also Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984) (parents of African-
American children could not challenge IRS regulations governing tax-exempt status of private 
schools; claimed injury that exempt schools could draw white students, thus perpetuating racial 
segregation, was "entirely speculative"). 
6. And so to Plaintiffs claim of harm. It does not fit into the three cases it cited. 
Take first Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998). The potato growers there would 
have lost a tax credit if the President's line-item veto effectively eliminating the credit had stood. 
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Plaintiff suggests that the potato growers had competitor standing "to challenge the President's 
cancellation of a tax benefit that put [the potato growers] at a disadvantage with its competitors." 
Memo. in Opp'n to Def. 's Mot. Dismiss p. 4. But what Plaintiff misses is that the statute gave 
the growers something that the line-item veto would have taken away. Standing there is fairly 
straightforward; the plaintiff was the object of the challenged governmental conduct. Indeed, 
the tax credit was a "bargaining chip" for parties like the potato growers to use in acquiring 
assets; "[b]y depriving them of their statutory bargaining chip, the cancellation [of the tax credit] 
inflicted a sufficient likelihood of economic injury to establish standing under our precedents." 
Id. at 432. But the Plaintiff here is not the object of the governmental action. 
Shirley v. Sebelius is of no help to Plaintiff either. There, the National Institutes of 
Health issued guidelines pursuant to presidential order that expanded the scope of stem-cell 
research projects that could be funded by the National Institutes of Health. 610 F.3d at 70-71. A 
group of physicians challenged that order as unlawful under the Administrative Procedure Act. 
Thus, the NIH guidelines permitted new entrants into a market for fixed resources; plaintiff 
physicians would face imminent increased competition for access to this limited, fixed amount of 
NIH funding. This intensified competition, though, was a certainty. Id. at 74. Importantly, the 
government in Shirley lifted regulatory restrictions that drew more competitors into a market 
with limited funds to disperse. Here, of course, the Reimbursement Incentive Act merely makes 
money available to a business that meets the standards set out in the statute. And Plaintiff fails 
to allege any facts relating to actual competition. Again, its only allegations are that it may have 
to do certain things to compete. But Plaintiff fails to even allege what the market is, its share, 
and how, precisely, the tax credit-rather than all the other market factors-would injure 
Plaintiffs competitive position in the market. It is therefore far from a certainty-indeed, it is 
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purely speculative-whether Plaintiff will be injured and how the grant of a tax credit to one 
competitor will harm it. 
Plaintiff's case is also unlike U.S. Telecom Association v. Federal Communications 
Commission, 295 F.3d 1326 (D.C. Cir. 2002). There, telecom providers challenged the FCC's 
order that another telecom provider was a common carrier under the Telecommunications Act 
and therefore eligible for a subsidy for which the petitioners were not. The common carrier 
classification and its attendant subsidy allowed the competitor to sell telecom services at a lower 
cost than the petitioners. Id. at 1331. It was in the context of this differential treatment of two 
classes of providers-one eligible for a subsidy, one not-that the D.C. Circuit found injury to 
competitive interests sufficient to establish standing. Here, of course, Plaintiff is eligible to 
apply for the tax credit if it does the things the statute requires. It has simply chosen not to. 
The D.C. Circuit's finding of standing in U.S. Telecom Association was aided by 
affidavits submitted by the petitioners showing that they had lost out on contracts and that the 
subsidy flowing from the common carrier classification left them "unable to compete for new 
customers .... " Id. 2 Plaintiff has not alleged anything other than speculative guesses at what it 
may have to do to maintain a competitive position in the marketplace. It has not alleged loss of 
sales, contracts, clients, or an inability to secure new contracts. 
Plaintiff disputes Martin's relevance to this case, but it is relevant because Plaintiff's 
claim of harm is increased competition, just like the developer's was in Martin. The court in 
Martin did not credit the developer's argument that the additional supply of like-zoned lots 
2 The affidavits were submitted after oral argument in the D.C. Circuit, id. at 1330, not on 
summary judgment, as Plaintiff suggests. See Mem. in Opp'n to Def. 's Mot. to Dismiss p. 6. 
The case was a petition for review of the FCC order, which means there was no district court and 
no motion for summary judgment. See 28 U.S.C. § 2342(1) (courts of appeals have exclusive 
jurisdiction to determine validity of final orders of the FCC). 
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caused him harm even though the developer claimed he would suffer an immediate loss in value 
in his lots. Martin, 150 Idaho at 513-14, 248 P.3d at 1248-49. The court distinguished the 
developer's case from the hotel owner in Ameritel Inns, Inc. v. Greater Boise Auditorium 
District, 141 Idaho 849, 119 P.3d 624 (2005). In Ameritel Inns, the court explained that the hotel 
was a taxpayer whose funds were extracted by the taxing district; and that there would be an 
imminent and certain increase in taxes. But the mere increase in supply and lost market value in 
Martin was not enough. So too here. It is pure speculation how a tax credit to one company will 
negatively impact another participant in that market. By our count, there are no fewer than 
eleven tax credits for which businesses are eligible. Plaintiff already competes in a marketplace 
where tax credits flow to some businesses, and maybe to it, but not to others. It is not certain 
that this particular tax credit will cause Plaintiff any harm. 
Plaintiff is more like the developer in Martin, the travel agents in American Society of 
Travel Agents, the candidate in Fulani, the parents in Allen v. Wright, and the energy company in 
DEK Energy. For starters, this is not a situation where Plaintiff and the competitor play under 
different sets of rules. Plaintiff is fully eligible to do the things necessary to be eligible for the 
tax credit, apply for it, and benefit from it. This is not a case where a competitor has been given 
a clearer path that Plaintiff cannot seek to join. This is not a case where a regulatory body has 
expanded the class of businesses that may participate in a given market. 
7. Additionally, Plaintiff alleges increased competition only generally, and does not 
allege any demonstrable loss of market share or profits or quantify any financial impacts or other 
identifiable loss of competitive position in the marketplace. Do we know (a) what ERMC does? 
(b) how Paylocity competes? (c) the companies' relative market share? (d) each company's 
customer base? (e) whether ERMC has lost customers? or (f) how, specifically, it will lose 
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customers? Plaintiff has alleged none of these things. It merely alleges a general unfair 
economic advantage and lists some things it anticipates it will have to do to adapt to a 
competitor. See U.S. Telecom Association, 295 F.3d at 1331 (affidavits showing specific, real-
world harm directly attributable to actual lower prices hampering the telecoms' business 
interests); Am. Soc. of Travel Agents, 566 F.2d at 148-49 (no showing of customers who left or 
bought from the non-profit organization instead of plaintiffs). Plaintiffs allegations of harm are 
nothing more than an "exercise in the conceivable"; it simply asserts "that [it] can imagine 
circumstances in which [it] could be affected by the agency's action." United States v. Students 
Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures, 412 U.S. 669, 689 (1973). Accordingly, Plaintiffs 
alleged injury-in-fact fails the concreteness, imminence, and causal-connection test. 
8. This brings the argument to the other problem with Plaintiffs harm. It's self-
inflicted. The injuries alleged relate to things Plaintiff expects it will do now in response to the 
tax credit to the competitor. But the injury-in-fact requirement cannot be satisfied by self-
inflicted harm. See Nova Health Sys. v. Gandy, 416 F.3d 1149, 1157 n.8 (10th Cir. 2005); Petro-
Chem Processing, Inc. v. Envtl. Prof. Agency, 866 F.2d 433, 438 (D.C. Cir. 1989); Clapper v. 
Amnesty International, 133 S. Ct. at 1152-53. Self-inflicted harm done in anticipatory response 
to government conduct of which a plaintiff is not the object, breaks the causal chain necessary to 
show standing. Because Plaintiff has simply alleged a general "unfair advantage," its own 
expected conduct based on that alleged unfair advantage deprives the government conduct of any 
causal connection to Plaintiffs alleged harm. In Clapper v. Amnesty International, for example, 
the plaintiffs claimed that they had incurred costs based on a fear of being surveilled by a 
surveill~ce statute they challenged. But they lacked standing to challenge the statutory 
surveillance program because absent a "threat of certainly impending interception under § 1881 a 
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[the surveillance statute at issue], the costs that they have incurred to avoid surveillance are 
simply the product of their fear of surveillance," and that fear was "insufficient to create 
standing." 133 S. Ct. at 1152 (citing Larid v. Tatum, 408 U.S. I (1972)). Under the rationale in 
Clapper v. Amnesty International, the steps Plaintiff itself says it has taken or anticipates it will 
) 
have to take are insufficient to establish standing. 
* * * 
Anytime the government modifies the tax code or any one of myriad laws relating to 
commerce generally, that action has an impact on the marketplace and, to some degree, market 
participants. Participants react to those changes; changes in behavior carry risk and cost, risk 
and cost may produce benefit and the potential for innovation. But not every decision a business 
makes in response to a modification of the tax code or laws relating to commerce causes injury. 
Plaintiffs argument means that any time government acts this way, a party can manufacture 
standing through its own conduct in response to what it thinks someone else may do. There are 
too many contingencies in this theory to support standing. This reduces standing below the 
minimum threshold the Idaho Supreme Court has established, and it should be rejected. 
The Court should dismiss Plaintiffs complaint in its entirety, with prejudice, and enter 
judgment in Defendant's favor. 
DATED this 15th day of July, 2016. 
ST A TE OF IDAHO 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 15th day of July, 2016, I caused to be served a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing by the following method to: 
Christ T. Troupis 
TROUPIS LAW OFFICE 
801 E. State Street, Suite 50 
P.O. Box 2408 
Eagle, ID 83616 
[ZI U.S. Mail 
D Hand Delivery 
D Certified Mail, Return Receipt Requested 
D Overnight Mail 
D Facsimile: (208) 938-5482 
t2l Elec · Mail· c~@troupi 
--~ JW! 
Carl J. Withroe 
Deputy Attorney General 
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Christ T. Troupis, ISB # 4549 
TROUPIS LAW OFFICE 
801 E. State Street, Ste 50 
POBox2408 
Eagle, Idaho 83616 
Telephone: 208/ 938-5584 
Facsimile: 208/ 938-5482 
Email: ctroupis@troupislaw.com 
_,,,,, 
NO. ? ,,-
-J J FILED 
A.M. 4/ P.M 
----
JUL 2 6 2016 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk 
By RIC NELSON 
DEPUTY 
Attorney for Plaintiff Employers Resource, an Idaho Corporation 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR ADA COUNTY 
EMPLOYERS RESOURCE 
MANAGEMENT COMPANY, 
An Idaho Corporation, 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
Case No.: CV OC 1605467 
FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT 
FOR DECLARATORY 
MEGAN RONK, in her capacity as 
Director of ihe IDAHO 
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, 
RELIEF 
Defendant. 
COME NOW THE PLAINTIFF EMPLOYERS RESOURCE OF AMERICA, INC., 
an Idaho Corporation, by and through its attorney, Christ T. Troupis, and for its cause of action 
against Defendant, alleges as follows: 
1. This action arises under the provisions of Article II, § 1, Article III, § 1, and Article 
VII, §5 of the Idaho Constitution. Article II, §1 provides: 
The powers of the government of this state are divided into three distinct departments, the 
legislative, executive and judicial; and no person or collection of persons charged 
with the exercise of powers properly belonging to one of these departments shall exercise 
any powers properly belonging to either of the others, except as in this 
constitution expressly directed or permitted. 
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2. Article 3, §1 of the Idaho Constitution provides that: "The legislative power of the state 
shall be vested in a senate and house of representatives." 
3. Article VII, §5 of the Idaho Constitution, provides that "all taxes shall be uniform upon 
the same class of subjects ... [and] the legislature may allow such exemptions from taxation from 
time to time as shall seem necessary and just..." 
4. The Idaho Supreme Court has held that the functions of the legislature are to be 
exercised by it alone. The legislature has plenary authority in all matters of taxation except those 
prohibited or limited by the constitution. Union Pacific R. Co. v. Board of Tax Appeals, l 03 
Idaho 808,654 P.2d 901 (1982) 
5. In 2014, the Idaho legislature passed the Idaho Reimbursement Incentive Act, 
("IRIA") which was then amended in 2015. The IRIA authorizes tax credits to be issued by the 
Director of the Department of Commerce to a qualified business entity. To· qualify for the tax 
credit, a business entity files an application with the Department of Commerce. The application 
is reviewed by the Director solely to determine if all the information required by the statute is 
present. The completed application is then reviewed by an Economic Advisory Council ("EAC") 
within the Dept. of Commerce, whose members are appointed by the Governor. The EAC is 
established under Idaho Code §67-4704. 
6. This lawsuit is brought on the grounds that the Idaho Department of Commerce, 
by and through the actions of its Director and members of the Economic Advisory Council, has 
violated and is continuing to violate Article II, §1, Article III, §1 and Article VII, §5 of the Idaho 
Constitution of the Idaho Constitution by exercising non-delegable legislative power vested 
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solely in the Idaho Senate and House of Representatives, with respect to the determination of 
Idaho's tax policy and the issuance of tax exemptions and/or credits to some Idaho taxpayers. 
7. Plaintiff seeks relief in the form of a declaratory judgment that the actions of the 
Department of Commerce through its Director and Economic Advisory Council complained of 
herein, exceed the constitutional authority of the Executive Branch of Idaho State Government, 
and that Department, and that all such actions therefore should be declared null and void. 
8. Plaintiff Employers Resource Management Company, an Idaho Corporation, 
("Employers Resource") is one ofldaho's top privately-held companies. Recently, the EAC 
granted Paylocity, an Illinois company, and one of Employers' Resource competitors, a 28% 
credit against its future tax liabilities in return for its promise to create 'new jobs' in Boise. The 
estimated tax credit granted to Paylocity by the EAC is approximately $6,500,000. 
9. . The State of Idaho's grant of a massive tax break to Paylocity has given it an 
unfair economic advantage over Employers' Resource, including the ability to lure Plaintiffs' 
employees away from Employers' Resource. 
10. In June, 2016, following approval of its IRIA tax subsidy application, Paylocity 
contracted with the Idaho Department of Labor to receive an additional $1.2 million of Idaho 
Workforce Development Training Funds to train its Idaho employees. The Idaho Department of 
Labor announced issuance of the contract in a Press Release issued on July 5, 2016. A true and 
accurate copy of that Press Release is attached hereto, marked Exhibit A, and incorporated herein 
by reference. 
11. Employers Resource has and will suffer damages as a direct and proximate result 
of the actions of the State Department of Commerce alleged herein. Those damages include the 
following: 
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a) Paylocity is a web-based company. In anticipation of the web requirements to 
effectivelyy compete against Paylocity in Idaho, Employers Resource has incurred additional 
expenses for internet competitive software; 
b) Since Paylocity's receipt of tax credits is based in part on the number of 
employees it hires, Employers Resource expects that its key employees will be targeted by 
Paylocity because of their training, experience, and familiarity with Employers' existing Idaho 
customer base. Employers' will incur additional expense in salaries and other benefits to retain its 
key employees; 
c) Employers' anticipates the need to protect its existing Idaho business since 
Paylocity can afford to undercut Employers' pricing, in part due to its favorable tax treatment. 
Employers will incur expenses in advertising and marketing expenses to retain its clients; 
12. The discretionary administration of the Tax Reimbursement Incentive Program as 
applied to Employers' Resource's business damages Employers Resource and other Idaho 
businesses in the following ways: 
a) By rewarding the cannibalization of existing Idaho businesses by new entrants 
into the Idaho business market; 
b) By distorting the Idaho labor market through subsidization of salaries paid by 
chosen companies to the detriment of existing Idaho businesses, including Employers. 
c) By incentivizing Employers Resource and other existing Idaho businesses to 
relocate their principal offices to other states offering similar tax incentives to out of state 
businesses; 
d) By penalizing Idaho companies with established business in 'niche' markets; 
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e) By pitting Counties and Municipalities against each other to compete for new 
business by offering discretionary and arbitrary tax breaks. 
13. Defendant Megan Ronk is the Director of the Idaho Department of Commerce 
and is named in that official capacity. 
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION 
(For Declaratory Relief) 
14. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates by reference the allegations of Paragraphs 1-
13, as though set forth herein in full. 
15. The Idaho Constitution vests all taxing power in the Legislature. This plenary 
authority of the Legislature is not delegable, and forbf ds a delegation of unrestricted and 
unguided taxing power. 
16. The Idaho Department of Commerce is an agency within the Executive Branch of 
Idaho State Government. Pursuant to Article II, § 1 of the Idaho Constitution, all agencies within 
the Executive Branch are prohibited from exercising any of the powers reserved to the 
Legislative or the Judicial Branch of Idaho State Government. 
17. In or about 2014, the Idaho Legislature enacted Idaho Code §67-4739 which sets 
out statutory requirements for a business to qualify for a refundable tax credit from the State of 
Idaho. That statute provides: 
"(1) A business entity may claim a refundable tax credit for creating a minimum number 
of new jobs in the state ofldaho. In order to be considered for participation, an 
applicant or its designated representative must submit an application to the director 
and shall include: 
(a) A complete description of the proposed project and the economic benefit that 
will accrue to the ·state as a result of the project; 
(b) A description or explanation of whether the project will occur or how it will be 
altered if the tax credit application is denied by the council; 
( c) Proof of a community match; 
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( d) A letter from the tax commission confirming that the applicant is in good 
standing in the state of Idaho and is not in unresolved arrears in the payment of 
any state tax or fee administered by the tax commission; 
( e) A detailed statement with an estimate of Idaho goods and services to be 
consumed or purchased by the applicant during the term; 
(f) Known or expected detriments to the state or existing industries in the state; 
(g) An anticipated project inception date ~d proposed schedule of progress; 
(h) Proposed performance requirements and measurements that must be met prior to 
issuance of the tax credit; 
(i) A detailed description of the proposed capital investment; 
G) A detailed description of jobs to be created, an approximation of the number of 
such jobs to be created and the projected average wage to be paid for such jobs; 
(k) A detailed description of the estimated new state tax revenues to be generated by 
the project; 
(1) Identification of any individual or entity included within the application that is 
entitled to a rebate pursuant to section 63-3641 or 63-4408, Idaho Code, or is 
required to obtain a separate seller's permit pursuant to chapter 36, title 63, 
Idaho Code; and 
(m)The federal employer identification or social security number for each individual 
or entity stated as the business entity in the agreement. 
(2) Upon satisfaction by the director that all requirements are met pursuant to this 
chapter, the director shall submit such application to the council [Economic Advisory 
Council]. The council shall review the application, may request additional 
information and shall approve or reject the application. An approval or rejection from 
the council shall not be considered a contested case pursuant to chapter 52, title 67, 
Idaho Code; provided, however, that nothing in this section shall prohibit an 
aggrieved applicant from seeking judicial review as provided in chapter 52, title 67, 
Idaho Code. 
(3) If the council approves the application, the council shall instruct the director to enter 
into an agreement with the applicant with the terms of the council's approval. If the 
council rejects an application, the applicant may reapply with a new application." 
18. The only requirement that the legislature included in Idaho Code §67-4739 for a 
business to obtain EAC approval of a tax credit application, apart from providing information to 
the Director of the Department of Commerce, is the creation of "new jobs." In order to claim the 
tax credit, an entity must create a minimum number of new jobs in the state of Idaho. "Minimum 
new jobs" is defined in Idaho Code §67-4738(11) as "not less than twenty (20) such jobs over 
First Amended Complaint for Declaratory Relief 6 
000069
the term of the project if created within a rural community, or not less than fifty (50) such jobs 
over the term of the project if created within an urban community." 
19. Idaho Code §67-4739(l)(a) - (m) specifies information required to be provided as 
part of the tax credit application process. However, in enacting this statute, the Idaho Legislature 
did not establish standards, guidelines, or requirements as to how or whether this information is 
to be used in the process of approving an application for issuance of a tax credit. Further, the 
statute does not mandate that the EAC issue any required factual findings in support of the 
approval or disapproval of an applicant's request for a tax credit. Without such objective or even 
subjective standards in place, all decisions of the EAC are for all practical purposes, exempt 
from substantive review by the Judicial Branch of Idaho State Government. 
20. Under the provisions ofldaho Code §67-4739, the EAC exercises complete 
discretion in determining whether to grant or deny an application. The determination that an 
entity will create the required number of'new jobs' is at once arbitrary and capricious, in that the 
Council alone evaluates information submitted with no required objective criteria or findings, 
and has unlimited discretion to grant or deny any application regardless of the information 
submitted. 
21. The Director of the Department of Commerce has yielded all authority to the 
EAC with regard to the grant or denial of tax credits. The Director's sole duty is to determine 
whether the application is complete. If so, the Director is required to submit the application to the 
EAC, whose decision is conclusive, and whose discretion is unlimited. 
22. Although provision has been made for judicial review of a rejected application by 
the aggrieved applicant, the law provides that a denial is not considered a "contested case," and 
the law with regard to appeal of an administrative agency decision requires the Court to defer to 
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the agency's exercise of discretionary authority. So, as a practical matter, there is no judicial 
remedy to an aggrieved applicant. 
23. The only purported limit on the EAC's discretionary authority to grant a tax credit 
to a business is the requirement that a business entity create 'new jobs.' However, even with 
respect to that one requirement, the Idaho Legislature did not enact any "standards, guidelines, 
restrictions or qualifications" in the IRIA. As a result, the EAC has virtually unlimited 
discretionary authority to determine whether an entity qualifies for favorable tax treatment, and 
the same unlimited discretionary authority to deny such tax relief to other selected business 
entities. Without such objective standards, the exercise of EA C's grant of authority is subject to 
political favoritism, corruption and cronyism. 
24. Plaintiff is informed and believes that the Idaho Department of Commerce, by and 
through the EAC, has and will continue to grant tax relief to selected businesses arbitrarily and 
capriciously, and by reason of these facts has and is exercising powers reserved under the Idaho 
Constitution to the Legislature and the Judiciary, and in the exercise of those powers, is violating 
Article II, §1, Article III, §1 and Article VII, §5 of the Idaho Constitution. 
25. Employers Resource and other Idaho businesses and taxpayers have and will 
suffer irreparable harm if the Idaho Department of Commerce, by and through the EAC, 
continues to exercise its unlimited discretion to grant tax relief to some business entities and 
deny that relief to other entities, on an arbitrary and capricious basis, in violation of the Idaho 
Constitution's grant of all taxing authority to the state Legislature. 
26. Plaintiff is entitled to have the Court enter its Decree Declaring that the Idaho 
Department of Commerce and the Economic Advisory Council within that Department do not 
have authority under the Idaho Constitution to administer the provisions of Idaho Code §67-
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4739, and do not have constitutional authority to issue tax credits to business entities selected by 
the Department under the provisions of this Act, and that all actions taken by the Idaho 
Department of Commerce and the EAC under this statute are null and void. 
27. Plaintiff has been required to retain counsel to prosecute this action to vindicate 
the Constitutional rights of Plaintiff Employers Resource and other Idaho businesses and 
taxpayers, and therefore is entitled to recover its reasonable attorneys' fees and costs incurred 
herein. 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for judgment against Defendants as follows: 
1. For a judicial decree declaring that the action of the Idaho Department of Commerce, 
by and through the Economic Advisory Council, in administering the IRIA, and 
granting tax credits, are in excess of its constitutional authority and therefore null and 
void. 
2. For attorneys' fees and costs of suit incurred herein; and 
3. For such other and further relief as the Court deems just and equitable. · 
Dated: July 21, 2016 
By oti?T~ 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 21st day of July, 2016, a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing First Amended Complaint was served as follows: 
Steven L. Olsen 
Carl J. Withroe 
Deputy Attorney General 
954 W. Jefferson Street, 2nd Floor 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, Idaho 83720-0100 
[ ] First Class Mail 
[ x] Hand Delivery 
[ ] Facsimile (208) 336-9712 
[ ] Overnight Delivery 
Christ T. Troupis 
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Idaho Department of Labor 
News > News Releases 
Date: 7/5/2016 
Information Contact 1: Georgia Smith: (208) 332-3570 X 2102: 
Information Contact 2: Carmela Ramirez: 208-332-3570 ext. 3964: 
Paylocity Receives $1.2 Million to Train New Employees 
Paylocity Corporation (NASDAQ: PCTY) has contracted with the Idaho Department of Labor to use $1.2 million in Idaho 
Workforce Development Training Funds to equip its new employees with the skills necessary to operate its new Idaho 
facility. 
The positions will pay an average hourly wage of $21 plus employer-assisted medical benefits. 
Paylodty is a cloud-based payroll and human capital management software services company for mid-sized 
organizations. The publicly traded company was named one of the 500 fastest-growing technology companies in 2013, 
2014 and 2015 by Deloitte Touche Tohmalsu Limited. 
The Boise-based jobs will include client service, implementation, technical services, software development and other 
related _tun~ons. The company has created 50+ new jobs in the Treasure Valley since opening up its doors in January of 
this year. Paylocity anticipates creating up to 500 new positions in Idaho. 
Idaho's Workforce Development Training Fund, established in 1996, is used to reimburse businesses for the cost of 
training new workers or retraining existing workers who would otherwise be laid off. Eligible businesses must produce a 
product or service sold outside their region, and the jobs must pay at least $12 an hour and include employer-assisted 
health Insurance. The fund is financed by a 3 percent set-aside of the unemployment insurance taxes paid by businesses 
each year. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT .OF 
\ 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR.'l'HE COUNTY OF ADA 
EMPLOYERS RESOURCE MANAGEMENT 
COMP ANY, an Idaho Corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MEGAN RONK, in her capacity as Director of 
the IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, 
Defendant. 
) 
. 
.. , 
) Case No. CV OC 1605467 
) 
) DEFENDANT'S RENEWED 
) MOTION TO DISMISS 
} .• 
) . Oral .Argument Requested 
) . 
) 
) 
) 
) 
.. 
: ~ 
_______________ ) 
Defendant, Idaho Department of Commerce Director Megan Ron1c, renews her Motion to 
Dismiss for the reasons set forth in her Memorandum in Support':of Defendant'J 1Motion to 
. 
Dismiss filed May 4, 2016, and her Reply Memorandum in support ofh~r fust Itibtion to dismiss 
filed July 15, 2016, and for the reasons to be discussed at oral argument in this matter . 
. . : ·i'j 
!1 ' ' ' " 11 I ~ I 4 
I j l I C !,,! 
'.!:,:; 
DEFENDANT'S RENEWED MOTION TO DISMISS - l ORIGINAL 
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DATED this 1st day of August, 2016. 
Car . Witbroe 
Deputy Attorney General 
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CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk 
By STEPHANIE HARDY 
DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
EMPLOYERS RESOURCE MANAGEMENT 
COMP ANY, an Idaho Corporation, 
Case No. CV-OC-2016-0005467 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER 
MEGAN RONK, in her capacity as Director of GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS FOR 
the Idaho Department of Commerce, LACK OF STANDING 
Defendant. 
This case concerns the constitutionality of the Idaho Reimbursement Incentive Act, which 
provides for refundable tax credits to businesses that create a minimum number of new, full-
time, non-seasonal jobs that pay an average wage equal to or exceeding wages in the relative 
county. Employers Resource Management Company (ERMC) filed this action on March 23, 
2016 against Megan Ronk as Director of Idaho Department of Commerce (Ronk), seeking 
declaratory relief. 
BACKGROUND 
ERMC offers human resources solutions that include human resources management, personnel 
file maintenance, personnel form management, vacation tracking and reporting, sick leave 
I 
tracking and reporting, new hire reporting, unemployment claim management, FLSA regulation 
. 
I 
expertise, DOL compliance expertise, regulation monitoring, employee handbooks, performance 
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review materials, and online training. It also provides payroll services; HR and tax compliance; 
workers compensation and safety programs; safety management; benefits solutions; employee 
savings club, such as Christmas savings club and vacation savings club; retirement plans; and 
JumpStart programs. 
The Idaho Reimbursement Incentive Act is a statutory scheme to incentivize companies to bring 
employment to Idaho. The statute provides refund tax credits to both existing Idaho businesses 
and new Idaho businesses. A business may apply to receive a refundable tax credit for up to 15 
~ 
years. Once an applicant has applied, the Commerce director does an in-depth economic 
analysis of the project and the application material and either submits the application and a 
recommended term and percentage of refund to the Economic Advisory Council or she may 
determine that the business has not met eligibility requirements. 
The Council may approve or reject her recommendation and/or may request additional 
information. If the application is approved, the business and Commerce Department enter into 
an agreement (specifying the terms of the credit, duration of the credit, for casted amount of new 
tax revenue the project will generate, and percentage of tax revenues that will be reimbursed). 
Each year, a business will be evaluated and must demonstrate that it is in compliance with its 
agreement with the Commerce Department and other requirements. The Commerce Department 
then determines if the credit should be provided. ERMC does not allege it applied for the tax 
credit refund. ERMC alleges another company, Paylocity, applied and was approved for a tax 
credit of 28%, or possibly $6.5 million. 1 
1 Comp!. For Deel. J. ,r 8. 
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Ronk filed a Motion to Dismiss on May 4, 2016, asserting ERMC lacks standing to challenge the 
constitutionality of this statute. ERMC filed a Response brief on May 20, 2016. ERMC filed a 
Motion for Leave to File Amended Complaint and Declaration of Christ Troupis on, May 26, 
2016. Ronk filed a Reply brief on July 15, 2016, further asserting ERMC does not have standing 
because it cannot show injury in fact. 
A hearing was held on July 20, 2016 in which the Court granted ERMC's Motion for Leave to 
File Amended Complaint. On July 26, 2016, ERMC filed an Amended Complaint for 
Declaratory Relief. Ronk then renewed the Motion to Dismiss. The hearing was held on August 
2, 2016 and the matter then taken under advisement. 
LEGAL STANDARD 
"A court may grant a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) only 
when it appears beyond doubt that the ERMC can prove no set of facts in support of the claim 
which would entitle the ERMC to relief." Harper v. Harper, 122 Idaho 535,536, 835 P.2d 1346, 
1347 (Ct. App. 1992). In ruling on a motion to dismiss, the issue "is not whether the ERMC will 
ultimately prevail, but whether the party is entitled to offer evidence to support the claims." 
Losser v. Bradstreet, 145 Idaho 670, 673, 183 P.3d 758, 761 (2008). "A motion to dismiss must 
be resolved solely from the pleadings and all facts and inferences from the record are viewed in 
favor of the non-moving party." Taylor v. McNichols, 149 Idaho 826, 832-33, 243 P.3d 642, 
648-49 (2010). 
To state a claim for relief and survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the pleading "does not need 
detailed factual allegations," however, the "[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right 
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to relief above the speculative level." Bell At/. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 545, 127 S. Ct. 
1955, 1959 (2007). Mere "labels and conclusions" or a "formulaic recitation of a cause of 
action's elements will not do." Id. There must be "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is 
plausible on its face." Id. at 547, 127 S. Ct. at 1960. Stated differently, "[the] complaint must 
contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its 
face." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009). "As a practical 
matter, a dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is likely to be granted only in the unusual case in which 
the ERMC includes allegations showing on the face of the complaint that there 1s some 
insurmountable bar to relief." Harper, 122 Idaho at 536, 835 P.2d at 1347. 
ANALYSIS 
Fundamentally, Courts avoid wading into political issues which are better left for the other two 
branches of the government which are better equipped to address. Mechanisms have been 
established to make sure that Courts stay within their roles to decide actual live controversies 
between parties. Ripeness, Mootness, and Standing are three of these mechanisms. 
ERMC alleges the refund credit has given Palocity an unfair economic advantage over ERMC 
and the "ability to lure away employee's from ERMC."2 ERMC further alleges that "Idaho 
taxpayers have and will suffer harm if Idaho Department of Commerce, by and through EAC, 
continues to grant tax relief to some business entities and deny relief to others .... "3 Ultimately, 
ERMC contends it has "competitor standing." 
2 Amended Comp. for Deel. J. ,r 9. 
3 Compl. For Deel. Relief,r 22. 
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ERMC's alleged injuries are (1) it had to buy "competitive software" to effectively compete 
against Paylocity;4 (2) it will have to increase salaries and benefits to prevent losing valuable 
employees to Paylocity;' 5 and (3) it will need to spend more money on advertising and marketing 
to retain its clients, because Paylocity will receive a tax refund and can undercut ERMC's 
pricing.6 ERMC further alleges that it and other businesses are damaged by (4) "rewarding 
cannibalization of existing Idaho businesses by new entrants into the Idaho business market;"7 
(5) "distorting the Idaho labor market through subsidization of salaries paid by chosen 
companies to the detriment of existing Idaho businesses";8 (6) "incentivizing relocation of 
principle officers to other states that provide similar tax incentives";9 (7) "penalizing Idaho 
companies with established business in "niche" markets"; 10 and (8) "pitting Counties and 
Municipalities against each other to compete for new businesses." 11 
Ronk asserts that ERMC (1) does not have a legally protected interest in its competitive position 
in the market; (2) the alleged harm is speculative and not imminent; (3) the alleged harm is self-
inflicted and too attenuated and contingent to meet the standing requirement.12 Further, Ronk 
asserts that ERMC alleges only a general increase in competition, but does not allege any 
specific or demonstrable loss of market shares, profits, any concrete financial impact, or any 
other identifiable loss of competitive position in the marketplace. 
4 Amended Comp. for Deel. J. ,r 1 l(a). 
5 Id. at,r }}(b). I 
6 Id. at ,r ll(c). 
7 Id.at ,r 12(a). 
8 Id. at ,r 12(b). 
9 Id. at ,r 12(c). 
IO Jd. at ,r }2(d). 
11 Id. ,r 12(3). 
12 Reply Mem. In Sup. OfDef.'s Mot. To Dismiss, p.2. 
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It is a fundamental tenet of American jurisprudence that a person wishing to invoke a court's 
jurisdiction must have standing. Van Valkenburgh v. Citizens for Term Limits, 135 Idaho 121, 
124, 15 P.3d 1129, 1132 (2000). Standing is a preliminary question to be determined by this 
Court before reaching the merits of the case. Miles v. Idaho Power Co., 116 Idaho 635, 637, 778 
P.2d 757, 759 (1989). The doctrine of standing is a subcategory of justiciability. Id at 639, 778 
P.2d at 761. The doctrine is imprecise and difficult to apply. Id at 641, 778 P.2d at 763. 
Standing focuses on the party seeking relief and not on the issues the party wishes to have 
adjudicated. Young v. City of Ketchum, 137 Idaho, 104, 44 P.3d 1157, 1159 (2002). 
To establish standing, a litigant must allege or demonstrate an injury in fact and a substantial 
likelihood the relief requested will prevent or redress the claimed injury. Young, at 104-05, 44 
P.3d at 1159-60. This requires a showing of a distinct palpable injury and fairly traceable causal 
connection between the claimed injury and the challenged conduct. Id But even if a showing 
can be made of an injury in fact, standing may be denied when the asserted harm is a generalized 
grievance shared by all or a large class of citizens. Id 
First, in order to have standing, one must have a protectable legal interest. An injury in fact must 
be an injury which the plaintiff has a legally protect interest in. ERMC relies on the theory of 
competitor standing, but fails to address the issue that in order to demonstrate injury in fact, the 
injury must be to an actual legally protectable interest. ERMC's argument assumes that ERMC 
has a legally protectable position in the marketplace, which it does not. 
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Where there is a direct impediment to a company, then a company may be potentially harmed in 
a way that is sufficient to show a protectable legal interest. In contrast, when the conduct is 
directed at a third party, with no direct impact to the plaintiff that is traceable to the government 
conduct, then there is no protectable interest at stake. This is the situation in this case. The 
government conduct is directed at a third party, Palocity and other businesses who qualify for the 
tax credit, and not ERMC. The conduct has no direct impact on the ERMC that is traceable to 
the government conduct. Accordingly, EMRC has no protectable interest at stake in this matter. 
Additionally, ERMC alleges that the tax refund would injure its competitive position in the 
market. ERMC alleged that a tax credit has incentivized a competitor to set up its business in 
Idaho and ERMC will have to do certain things to compete against this competitor. It must be 
noted that ERMC is not the object of the government action. Instead, Paylocity, a third party, is 
the object of the government action. This fails to satisfy the requirement that there is a 
"substantial likelihood that the relief requested will prevent the claimed injury." ERMC has only 
alleged a mere possibility that competition will increase13 and that there is a possibility that the 
increased competition will injure ERMC. ERMC purported injuries are abstract and speculative 
and cannot be said to be specific or distinct and palpable. 
The essence of the standing inquiry is whether the party seeking to invoke the court's jurisdiction 
has "alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure the concrete 
adversariness which sharpens the presentation upon which the court so depends for illumination 
of difficult constitutional questions." As refined by subsequent reformation, this requirement of 
"personal stake" has come to be understood to require not only a "distinct palpable injury" to the 
13 Which is the actual purpose of this legislation. 
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plaintiff, but also a "fairly traceable" causal connection between the claimed injury and the 
challenged conduct. Miles v. Idaho Power Co., 116 Idaho 635,641, 778 P.2d 757,763 (1989). 
The rule which ERMC relies on to assert standing is competitor standing to establish that it has a 
personal. stake, or distinct palpable injury. The general rule is that a competitor has standing to 
challenge future loss of profits. National Tank Truck Carriers v. Lewis, 550 F.Supp. 113, 117 
(D.C. Dist. Ct. 1982). However, Idaho has not recognized competitor standing. Martin v. 
Camas County, 150 Idaho 508,514,248 P.3d 1243, 1249 (2011). Further, even when competitor 
standing has been recognized, "it is only when a successful challenge will set up an absolute bar 
to competition, not merely an additional hurdle, that competitor standing exists." Id A 
successful challenge of the Reimbursement Act will not close the market to Paylocity or other 
competitors within ERMC's market; instead, it will only add an additional hurdle. 
Finally, ERMC fails to establish the causal link between the government action and the harm 
alleged, even if it were unique and particularized. When the person is not the object of the 
government conduct, causation hinges on the responses of someone else and that response is not 
necessarily predictable or controllable, which makes any link between the harm and the 
government conduct extremely difficult to grasp. Governmental conduct that benefits a third 
party which then indirectly affects the plaintiff is distinguishable from government conduct that 
directly affects the plaintiff. 
Ultimately, ERMC alleges the government action creates an unfair economic advantage to a 
competitor. While this may be true in general, it is insufficient to demonstrate that the 
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government conduct, and not other market factors, is the specific cause of any actual harm to any 
legally protected interest that ERMC may enjoy. There is no clear link between the impact of the 
law and any harm claimed to ERMC, the alleged damages are speculative at best, it would be 
impossible to demonstrate that a judgment in ERMC's favor would redress the claimed 
injuries. 14 
Lastly, at the hearing on August 2, 2016, Ronk's counsel requested the Court strike Paragraph 10 
of the First Amended Complaint and the accompanying attachment. ERMC's First Amended 
Complaint, as filed, was different than the proposed amended complaint attached to the 
Declaration filed in support of the Motion for Leave to file the Amended Complaint. Paragraph 
10 and the accompanying attachment were not contained in the original proposed amended 
complaint. Accordingly, Paragraph 10 and the attachment are deemed stricken, pursuant to 
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure 12(f), and were not considered. Nevertheless and in any event, 
the information contained therein would not have impacted the outcome of this decision. 
CONCLUSION 
ERMC challenges the legislature's exercise of its constitutional authority. But ERMC has no 
standing to challenge the Reimbursement Act because the program makes tax credits available to 
businesses that meet certain criteria. The program does not actually do anything to ERMC, 
therefore, ERMC has suffered no particularized injury by which to establish standing in a 
challenge to the act. Instead, ERMC attempts to manufacture standing by alleging it may have to 
do certain things or that it expects certain things will occur as a response to another company 
14 Even ifERMC did have standing, however, and contrary to ERMC's assertion, this is a politician issue that is well 
within the authority of the legislature. 
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receiving a tax credit under the program. In short, ERMC has no protectable, legal interest that 
has been directly damaged by the Act; the claim of injury is ill-defined, fuzzy, and speculative, 
essentially self-inflicted in mere anticipation and expectation of what may happen. 
Based upon the above and foregoing, Ronk's Motion to Dismiss ERMC's Amended Complaint 
for lack ~f standing is GRANTED. Judgment will be entered accordingly. 
IT IS SO ORDERED this 1 ~f August, 2016. 
District Judge 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on this Js"aay of August, 2016, I mailed (served) a true and correct copy of 
the within instrument to: 
Mr. Carl Withroe, &q. 
954 W. Jefferson St. 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, ID 83720-0010 
Mr. Christ Troupis, Esq. 
P.O. Box 2408 
Eagle, ID 83616 
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AUG 15 2016 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk 
By STEPHANIE HARDY 
DEPl.lTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
EMPLOYERS RESOURCE MANAGEMENT 
COMP ANY, an Idaho Corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MEGAN RONK, in her capacity as Director of 
the Idaho Department of Commerce, 
Defendant. 
JUDGMENT IS ENTERED AS FOLLOWS: 
Case No. CV-OC-2016-0005467 
JUDGMENT 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that Plaintiffs Amended 
Complaint is hereby DISMISSED in its entirety. 
IT IS SO ORDERED this /).,~day of August, 2016. 
District Judge 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
Jl:--
1 hereby certify that on this / ; day of August, 2016, I mailed ( served) a true and correct copy of the 
within instrument to: 
Mr. Carl Withroe, Esq. 
954 W. Jefferson St. 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, ID 83720-0010 
Mr. Christ Troupis, Esq. 
P.O. Box 2408 
Eagle, ID 83616 
JUDGMENT-2 
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Christ T. Troupis, ISB # 4549 
TROUPIS LAW OFFICE 
PO Box2408 
Eagle, Idaho 83616 
Telephone: 2081938-5584 
Email: ctroupis@troupislaw.com 
r.o \\ :SS1-,u:u A.M., ____ P.M ___ _ 
SEP 1 9 2016 
CHRISTOPHER o, FIICH, OIG!rk 
By SANTIAGO BAAAI08 
DEPUTV 
Attorney for Plaintiff Employers Resource, an Idaho Corporation 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR ADA COUNTY 
EMPLOYERS RESOURCE 
MANAGEMENT COMPANY, 
An Idaho Corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MEGAN RONK, in her capacity as 
Director of the IDAHO 
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, 
Defendant. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
_____________ ) 
Case No.: CV QC 1605467 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
TO: THE ABOVE-NAMED RESPONDENT, MEGAN RONK, in her capacity as 
Director of the Idaho Department of Commerce: 
1. The above-named Appellant, Employers Resource Management 
Company, hereby appeals against the above named Respondent to the 
Idaho Supreme Court from the final judgment entered in the above 
entitled action on the 15th day of August, 2016, The Honorable Samuel 
A. Hoaglund, District Judge Presiding. 
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. . 
2. That the party has the right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and 
the final judgment described in paragraph 1 is an appealable order 
under and pursuant to Rules 11(a)(1) I.A.R. 
3. A preliminary statement of the issues on appeal, which the Appellant 
intends to assert, provided, any such list of issues on appeal shall not 
prevent the appellant from asserting other issues on appeal, are as 
follows: 
(a) That the District Court erred in Granting Defendant Megan Ronk's 
Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Standing in finding that ERMC had no 
protectible interest that was harmed by the government's conduct in 
granting Paylocity a tax credit. 
(b) That the District Court erred in Granting Defendant Megan Ronk's 
Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Standing in finding that ERMC did not 
allege or demonstrate an injury in fact, fairly traceable to the 
challenged conduct, and a substantial likelihood that the relief 
requested would prevent or redress the claimed injury. 
(b) Appellant may assert other issues in addition to the foregoing. 
4. No order has been entered sealing all or any portion of the record. 
5. (a) Appellant requests the preparation of a reporter's transcript in both 
hard copy and electronic format of the following proceedings: 
Notice of Appeal 
(1) the July 20, 2016 hearing on Defendants' M~tion to Dismiss; 
(2) the August 3, 2016 hearing on Defendants' Motion to Dismiss 
2 
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6. Appellant requests the following documents to be included in the Clerk's 
Record on Appeal in addition to those automatically included under Rule 
7. 
Notice of Appeal 
28, I.A.R. 
(a) 5/4/2016 Motion to Dismiss Case 
(b) 5/4/2016 Memorandum 
(c) 5/20/2016 Memorandum 
(d) 5/20/2016 Notice of Hearing 
(e) 5/24/2016 Hearing Scheduled 
(f) 5/26/2016 Motion 
(g) 5/26/2016 Declaration 
(h) 5/26/2016 Memorandum 
(i) 7/15/2-16 Reply 
G) 7/20/2016 Hearing Held: Court Reporter:# of Pages 
(k) 7/20/2016 Hearing Scheduled 
(I) 7/20/2016 Motion to Dismiss 
(m)8/15/2016 Memorandum Order and Decision 
(n) 8/15/2016 Judgment 
I certify: 
(a) That a copy of this notice of appeal has been served on the District 
Court Reporter, Christy Olesek. 
(b) That the District Court reporter, Christy Olesek, has been paid $123.25 
for preparation of the reporter's transcript; 
(c) That the initial fee for preparation of the Clerk's record has been paid; 
3 
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(d) That the Appellants' filing fee has been paid; 
(e) That service has been made upon all parties required to be served 
pursuant to Rule 20. 
DATED this 19th day of September, 2016. 
Notice of Appeal 4 
By {'A-0')~ 
Christ T. Troupis I 
Attorney for Appellant 
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- . 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 19th day of September, 2016, I caused a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing NOTICE OF APPEAL BY EMPLOYERS RESOURCE 
MANAGEMENT COMPANY to be served upon the following person(s) in the following 
manner: 
[x] U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
[ ] Express Mail 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[] Facsimile Transmission 
[ ] Federal Express 
Steven L. Olsen 
Carl J. Withroe 
Deputy Attorney General 
954 W. Jefferson Street, 2nd Floor 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, Idaho 83720-0100 
Notice of Appeal 5 
By_{//4_;;;_--':::::;-)-~-"-/'---__ 
Christ T. Troupis f 
Attorney for Appellant 
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1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
-
To: Clerk of the Court 
Idaho Supreme Court 
451 West State Street 
(208) 334-2616 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
Docket No. 44511 
7 EMPLOYERS RESOURCE ) 
MANAGEMENT COMPANY, ) 
· 8 Plaintiff, ) 
) 
9 vs. ) 
) 
10 MEGAN RONK, in her capacity as ) 
Director of the IDAHO ) 
11 DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, ) 
Defendant. ) 
12 ------ __________ ) 
13 
14 
NOTICE OF TRANSCRIPT OF 30 PAGES LODGED 
Appealed from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial 
15 District of the State of Idaho, in and for the County of 
Ada. 
16 Honorable Samuel Hoagland, District Court Judge 
17 
One volume contains: 
18 7-20-16: Motion to Dismiss 
8-2-16: Motion to Dismiss 
19 
Date: October 11, 2016 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
/I ~(l !}/4.d_, ?'f R.. _LJ___________________ ___________________ _ 
Christine Anne Olesek, Official Court Reporter 
Official Court Reporter, 
Judge Samuel A. Hoagland 
Idaho Certified Shorthand Reporter No. SRL-1044 
Registered Professional Reporter 
CHRISTINE ANNE OLESEK 
SRL - 1044 
000095
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
EMPLOYERS RESOURCE 
MANAGEMENT COMP ANY, an Idaho 
Corporation, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 
MEGAN RONK, in her capacity as 
Director of the Idaho Department of 
Commerce, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
Supreme Court Case No. 44511 
CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS 
I, CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk of the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of 
the State ofldaho in and for the County of Ada, do hereby certify: 
There were no exhibits offered for identification or admitted into evidence during the 
course of this action. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said 
Court this 25th day of October, 2016. 
CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
EMPLOYERS RESOURCE 
MANAGEMENT COMP ANY, an Idaho 
Corporation, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 
MEGAN RONK, in her capacity as 
Director of the Idaho Department of 
Commerce, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
Supreme Court Case No. 44511 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, the undersigned authority, do hereby certify that I have 
personally served or mailed, by either United States Mail or Interdepartmental Mail, one copy of 
the following: 
CLERK'S RECORD AND REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT 
to each of the Attorneys of Record in this cause as follows: 
CHRIST T. TROUPIS 
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT 
EAGLE, IDAHO 
oc1 2 5 2.0\o 
Date of Service: 
--------
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
CARL J. WITHROE 
ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDENT 
BOISE, IDAHO 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
EMPLOYERS RESOURCE 
MANAGEMENTCOMPANY,anldaho 
Corporation, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 
MEGAN RONK, in her capacity as 
Director of the Idaho Department of 
Commerce, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
Supreme Court Case No. 44511 
CERTIFICATE TO RECORD 
I, CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk of the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of the 
State of Idaho, in and for the County of Ada, do hereby certify that the above and foregoing record in 
the above-entitled cause was compiled under my direction and is a true and correct record of the 
pleadings and documents that are automatically required under Rule 28 of the Idaho Appellate Rules, 
as well as those requested by Counsel. 
I FURTHER CERTIFY, that the Notice of Appeal was filed in the District Court on the 
19th day of September, 2016. 
CERTIFICATE TO RECORD 
